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Introduction 
Much of the literature on peacebuilding/statebuilding is characterized by a certain narcissism, in 
that it tends to exaggerate the power of external actors to do good (and bad).1 Researchers have 
tended to focus on UNSC mandates, on policy documents, resources, and on coordination problems, 
inferring from these how peacebuilders operate and their contribution to peace in a given country.2 
They thus treat the implementing level of peacebuilding efforts – what we here call everyday 
peacebuilding – largely as a black box. As a consequence, we know little about how peacebuilders 
at the country level are actually operating: how do they interpret the situation, assess different 
courses of action, adjudicate between conflicting objectives, and make decisions? Are there shared 
beliefs and informal ways of doing things among peacebuilders, and do these differ from official 
policies and guidelines? This study aims to help fill this gap in the literature on peacebuilding by 
examining what happens when “the book hits the ground” This offers a different vantage point for 
assessing current peacebuilding efforts and consider reforms.  
 
This study examines peacebuilding efforts in four quite diverse settings – in Afghanistan, Haiti, 
Liberia and Sudan. In Afghanistan, efforts to build peace take place amidst an on-going war. In 
Haiti (where the study was done before the earthquake), peacebuilding must be seen in the context 
of high levels of organized crime, weak state structures, and rapidly shifting governments. In 
Liberia, state structures are equally weak, but with a more stable political situation and a president 
that has the ear of the international donor community. In Sudan, peacebuilding is challenging both 
in the North and in the South, but for very different reasons.  
 
We focus on the principle of local ownership, for several reasons. It is among the principles of the 
Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness and is widely considered a precondition for sustainable 
peacebuilding. Moreover, ownership is derived from the institution of sovereignty. By implication, 
therefore, the principle of ownership is more fundamental for peacebuilding than its (changing) 
substantive content. Ownership concerns the generic procedures through which external actors 
relate to and interact with internal actors.3  
 
Analyses of post-conflict reconstruction efforts typically find that while some progress is made in 
building capacity, in establishing new institutions and in starting economic recovery, there is little 
institutionalization of the international community’s peacebuilding efforts. Investments in capacity 
building fail to engender change in social relations, and new institutional frameworks are often 
captured by elite groups seeking to perpetuate their power. As a result, investments in 
reconstruction and peacebuilding often fail to yield sustainable peace dividends. Various 
explanations have been offered for this, ranging from lack of resources and long-term commitment 
to poor strategies and lack of coordination among external actors.  
 
While relevant, these explanations do not go to the heart of the matter. Our research supports 
conclusions which show that the behaviour of local actors is more important than that of external 
actors in determining whether a sustainable change will emerge over time. If peacebuilding efforts 
                                                     
1 Englebert, Pierre and Denis M. Tull (2008) “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States” 
International Security 32(4):106-139; Bhuta, Nehal (2008) ”Against State-Building” Constellations, vol.15, no.4, 517-542. 
2 Doyle, Michael and Nicholas Sambanis (2000). “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis”, 
American Political Science Review 94(4): 779-801; Paris, Roland (2004), At Wars End, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press; Chandler, David (2006), Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building, London: Pluto Press; Barnett, Michael 
(2006) “Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War” International Security, vol.30, no.4, pp. 87-111. 
3 Sending, Ole Jacob (2009), “Why Peacebuilders are “Blind” and “Arrogant” and What to do About it”, NUPI Policy 
Brief, 3/2009, Oslo: NUPI.  
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are to be institutionalized and sustained, local stakeholders will have to commit themselves to a new 
way of organizing and governing society. There must be “local ownership”.  
 
While much has been written on ownership in relation to development cooperation, there has been 
little or no systematic empirical analysis of how local actors define and understand ownership in the 
field of peacebuilding. The present study helps to fill this gap by linking in-depth interviews with 
external actors to in-depth interviews with local actors, assessing where their views are 
corresponding or differing.  
 
Three ideal-typical models of local ownership, based on perceptions and understandings held by 
international as well as local actors, can be identified;  
 
 Ownership is a goal or an outcome of peacebuilding efforts. Ownership concerns getting 
local actors to internalize the values and goals that underwrite liberal peacebuilding. It 
follows that ownership can be achieved through persuasion, socialization, incentives, 
discipline, etc. Central in this model is the assumption that ownership is a modality for 
achieving “sustainability”. 
 Ownership is a right – a question of domestic sovereignty and thus autonomy and control.  
 Ownership is a conditional right that presumes capacity and responsibility. Factors that 
hamper ownership are here seen as inadequate capacity building, lack of motivation or a 
lack of will.  
 
International policies to promote “local ownership” are shaped by many factors, including mandate 
and interests at the headquarters and in the field, but three cross-cutting dimension are of particular 
interest to this study:  
 
 What is the meaning of “ownership”? Ownership can be interpreted in different ways, as 
consultation, participation, control, accountability, sovereignty, etc.4. Is ownership to be 
“respected”, “allowed”, or “established”? Use of certain language or set of categories 
typically legitimizes some types of intervention and marginalizes others.5 How does 
understanding and use of the term “ownership” affect actions?  
 Who allies with whom in the implementation of “local ownership”? While the national 
government is the formally validated point of contact, external actors typically privilege 
some actors rather than others. What considerations inform the choice of partners? Local 
actors are often diverse, in competition or conflict with each other, and represent different 
commitments, values and interests. Local actors, in turn, use their relationship with external 
actors to increase their leverage, power, and autonomy to influence policy. Limited 
knowledge and understanding of the local scene among external actors often represents a 
source of knowledge to enhance autonomy for local actors.  
 How can international peacebuilders learn? Previous research has identified several 
organizational barriers to learning within the UN system.6 It seems that UN peace 
operations are more likely to be successful when learning from the environment and 
adapting to evolving situational factors at the country level.7 Hence, we ask to what extent 
field staff can adopt new practices and change standard operating procedures in response to 
evolving realities on the ground? How much leeway is there for international staff in the 
                                                     
4 See Chesterman, Simon (2007) “Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding 
Operations. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1(1):3-26. 
5 See Autesserre, Severine (2009) “Hobbes and the Congo” International Organization 63: 249-280. 
6 Torsten Benner and Phillip Rotman (2008) “Learning to Learn? UN Peacebuilding and the Challenges of Building a 
Learning Organization” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, vol 2, no. 1, pp. 43-62. 
7 Howard, Lise Morjé (2008) UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 19. 
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field to be flexible and innovative in light of UNSC mandates, demands from member 
states, and from instructions from New York?  
Summary of key findings 
 The discourse and practice of “local ownership” vary significantly according to country 
context.  
 As a rule, external actors do not seem to regard promotion of local ownership as a 
fundamental aspect of their job.  
 How local ownership is interpreted and acted upon by external actors is often antithetical to 
how ownership is defined and used in policy documents.  
 Local actors tend to understand ownership as a right, above all as a right to control 
externally initiated policies. External actors tend to understand ownership as a conditional 
right.  
 In claiming that ownership is a conditional right, external actors typically refer to lack of 
local responsibility, capacity or political will. By implication, external actors often assume 
that ownership is theirs to grant to local authorities or local stakeholders. 
 Ownership is in some cases not central in the frames of understanding and action that 
international staff use in seeking to build peace. Often it appears as a “problem” to be 
resolved or a challenge to overcome.  
 Incentives for promotion and careers within the UN system are heavily linked to measurable 
results and outputs, and not to local processes and the sustainability of reform efforts.  
 International staff often have limited knowledge of the society, language, culture and 
politics of the country where they serve, making it difficult to navigate among competing 
local claims of ownership.  
 Donor efforts to promote ownership typically face the dilemma of aligning with one 
sectional interest in the short run, while broad consensus on a national strategy only 
develops, if at all, over the long run.  
 International rules and administrative procedures that structure relations between the UN 
and national actors can place external actors in a superior position (e.g. in most multi-donor 
trust funds). In these cases, the UN acts within the framework of ownership as a very 
conditional right..  
 With respect to justice sector reforms, external actors and national authorities have until 
recently given priority to rebuilding the formal justice sector. This has often meant 
sidelining customary and local justice institutions. Increasing shift to incorporate 
institutions of informal justice, on the other hand, raises difficult questions regarding which 
local actors should be privileged in the promotion of local ownership, particular in matters 
regarding women’s rights. 
The country cases 
General questions regarding ownership are explored with reference to different aspects of 
peacebuilding in all the case studies. The different country case studies all focus on rule of law as a 
key component of peacebuilding. The case study on Afghanistan focuses on rule of law reforms in 
the area of women’s rights. The case study on Haiti (prior to the earthquake) looks at the broader 
efforts to reform the judiciary system. The case study on Liberia focuses on funding for rule of law 
efforts through the Peacebuilding Fund and how it structures attempts to secure ownership. The case 
study on Sudan looks at the different challenges of implementing rule of law program and securing 
ownership in the North and the South. 
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In the case of Afghanistan, Torunn W. Chaudhary, Orzala Ashraf and Astri Suhrke note how a 
prolonged international military presence, often misguided and poorly designed aid projects, and a 
president who has courted Islamist sentiments in public statements and political coalition-building 
have combined to undermine the appeal of Western models of reform, particularly in regard to 
women. In this political landscape, overt international support for women’s rights exposes Afghan 
women’s rights advocates to accusations of being Western agents. UN field offices and other 
international organizations and donor agencies thus risk playing a counterproductive role when 
responding to demands from Western headquarters and Western public opinion for a strong public 
position on women’s rights. Examining the making of two sets of laws – the Shia Personal Status 
Law and the law on Elimination of Violence against women (EVAW law) – the authors note the 
importance of the timing, context and form of international assistance for the national debate over 
specific laws. With the Shia law, there was broad agreement among its opponents that the 
internationals had an important role to play in lobbying such key political actors as President 
Karzai, the Minister of Justice Sarwar Danish and House Speaker Qanooni. Low-key and low-
profile international aid was best. Yet, when that failed to produce results, Afghan opponents were 
divided over the value of international public loudspeaker diplomacy. In the case of the EVAW law, 
the timing of international assistance was clearly a problem. Keen to protect the law as an Afghan 
product, key Afghan actors sought to limit international technical assistance. When that was offered 
unsolicited at a late stage in the process, the Afghan proponents of the bill rejected what was 
essentially sound international advice from a technical perspective. In both cases, but especially 
with regard to the Shia law, lack of knowledge constrained the internationals from providing timely 
and appropriate assistance.  
 
* * * 
 
In the case of Haiti, Amelie Gauthier and Madalena Moita show how there is widespread confusion 
as to what ownership entails and at what level it should be made a priority. Most reform efforts have 
focused on state institutions, thereby marginalizing broad sectors of society which are key to the 
Haitian polity. The authors note, for example, “how civil society organizations, usually closer to the 
citizenry expectations and needs, complain about not being consulted for strategies design”. The 
approach to ownership taken in Haiti, essentially seeking the participation of the government, has 
revealed several problems in a context of severe fragility. Key here is the fact that the government 
has changed three times in the last four years, and the minister of justice has changed even more 
often. Moreover, because institutional relations are based on personal connections and loyalties, 
newly appointed officials tend to reject or ignore what has been done in the past, and establish new 
priorities. In this sense, international actors need to adjust as they go, but the UN and other 
organizations have difficulties in operating in such a flexible manner. In addition, Haitian culture, 
where “everybody has a chief” and where few Haitians are willing to take the responsibility for a 
decision unless there is consensus, exacerbates the challenges of identifying and working with a 
clearly identifiable counterpart. Moreover, few if any accountability mechanisms as a practical tool 
for evaluating implementation and resource allocation according the needs of the population have 
been set in place by the UN or the government. Similarly, there is little in the way of mechanisms to 
institutionalize and make use of past experiences.  
 
* * * 
 
In the case of Liberia, Morten Skumsrud Andersen and Ole Jacob Sending find, first, that 
peacebuilders operating at the country level generally see ownership as a principle whose 
implementation is difficult if not impossible in Liberia. The capacity, responsibility, and in general 
political culture of Liberia are typically regarded in a way that justifies by-passing considerations of 
ownership. Ownership, then, is argued away or downplayed with reference to an ideal or a standard 
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that external actors define and apply in assessing Liberian institutions and politics. Studying the set-
up and functioning of the UN Peacebuilding Fund, the authors found that a series of institutional or 
organizational features beyond the control of UN staff in Liberia made it almost impossible to take 
ownership seriously. The issues range from the fact that UNDP – as administrative agent of the 
Fund in Liberia – operates in DEX mode (Direct Execution) rather than in NEX mode (National 
Execution), making it very difficult to disburse funds to Liberian actors. Moreover, the application 
procedure and the selection process for the Peacebuilding Fund – which is specifically aimed at 
fostering national capacity – was such that international actors were calling the shots on the contents 
of projects, the choice of partners, and their implementation.  
 
* * * 
 
In the case of Sudan, Samia Nager and Gunnar Sørbø draw attention to how ownership is 
interpreted quite minimally as participation in the actual implementation of projects, not in their 
design. They note, further, that while local ownership is seen as a key principle for aid effectiveness 
and a core value for UN agencies, it is not mentioned as a priority in most project documents; nor is 
there any obligation to consider or report on local ownership within a project. The main concern is 
with processes that can ensure the approval of the project or programme, and this is mostly done 
with minimal participation by local actors. Ownership does not play a role in the introductory 
courses for international staff coming to Sudan, and its promotion depends on individual rather than 
institutional initiatives. Finally, the authors show how asymmetrical relations between international 
and domestic actors are fostered by the widely held assumption that all local actors have only 
limited capacities, whereas all international actors are in a position to lead, educate and strengthen 
local capacities and skills.  
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Afghanistan 
By TORUNN WIMPELMANN CHAUDHARY, ORZALA ASHRAF NEMAT and ASTRI SUHRKE 
Chr. Michelsen Institute8 
 
 
Justice sector reform and human rights promotion are important areas of international assistance to 
post-conflict peace-building. In Afghanistan, recent legislation that affects the rights of women 
highlights the sensitive nature of international involvement in this area and the difficulty of 
rendering effective assistance.  
 
Afghan women have historically been afforded weak protection in the formal justice system and 
beyond. Furthermore, the position of women is a highly symbolic and contested issue around which 
various political groups mobilize. The post hoc justification for the 2001 international intervention 
to improve the situation of women is a case in point. Overall, the immense politicization of the 
status of women in Afghanistan makes reform in this area particularly challenging. The study 
examines the nature and consequences of international involvement in two recent pieces of 
legislation that affect the lives of Afghan women: The Shia Personal Status Law (hereafter “the Shia 
law”) and the law on Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW).  
The context 
Promoting women’s rights in post-Taliban Afghanistan is a matter of principle and formal policy in 
the UN system and the major Western countries. Western media, NGOs, human rights activists and 
public opinion generally make support for Afghan women’s rights a high-profile and non-debatable 
imperative, although rhetorical commitments have not always translated into practice. In Western 
policy debates, such rights are usually referenced to international human rights and other secular-
sourced instruments, such as the Convention to Eliminate all Forms of Discrimination and Violence 
against Women (CEDAW). Inside Afghanistan, however, the political field has become 
increasingly antagonistic to such discourses. A prolonged international military presence, often 
misguided and poorly designed aid projects, and a president who has courted conservative 
sentiments in both public statements and political coalition-building, all have combined to 
undermine the appeal of Western models of reform, particularly in regard to women. Moreover, 
overt international support for women’s rights exposes Afghan women’s rights advocates to 
accusations of being Western agents. 
 
In this political landscape, Afghan women’s rights activists, and officials working on governmental 
and non-governmental gender programmes have – whether for tactical reasons or out of genuine 
conviction – increasingly formulated gender rights within an Islamic framework and liberal 
interpretations of Sharia. Field offices of the UN, other international organizations and donor 
agencies in Afghanistan, in turn, have sought to calibrate different interests, in the first instance 
between demands from headquarters or “home” for a firm position on women’s rights, and the 
constraints of local conditions that could make the difference between effective and 
counterproductive assistance. 
 
                                                     
8 This report is based on fieldwork in Afghanistan in late 2009 and early 2010. The authors wish to thank the numerous 
persons – Afghans and international staff – who generously contributed of their time and knowledge. Some persons also 
read through and commented on an early draft, for which we are particularly grateful. 
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The two laws examined here presented quite different challenges. The Shia law originated among a 
group of Afghan Shia clerics with ties to religious scholars in Iran and was formulated according to 
orthodox Islamic jurisprudence. The law defined personal law (property, marriage, divorce) for the 
country’s Shia minority in terms that significantly restricted the rights of women and contained 
what many Afghan women and legal scholars saw as an excessive codification of personal life. Of 
particular concern in the West, the law established a legal understanding of marital relations in 
which the wife’s obedience, including in conjugal matters, is rendered in return for financial 
maintenance from the husband. This point was included in the version signed by President Karzai in 
March 2009, provoking international outrage. The UN High Commissioner on Human Rights called 
it “reprehensible”, President Barack Obama chose “abhorrent”.  
 
By contrast, the EVAW law originated in a completely different Afghan setting, framed by 20th 
century interpretations of women’s rights, their codification in CEDAW, and the views and 
experience of progressive Afghan women. Many of these women had direct experience of dealing 
with cases of violence against women through positions in the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, 
women’s NGOs, and the courts. The EVAW was signed as presidential decree in 2009, and as of 
early 2010 was still awaiting Parliamentary ratification.  
 
The parliamentary context at the time when the two laws were prepared and processed, (2005-
2010), was decidedly conservative. True, there were more women in the parliament than ever before 
in Afghanistan’s history, with 68 out of 249 members of the Lower House (Wolesi Jirga), and 23 of 
the 102 members in the Upper House (Meshrano Jirga). Yet they did not form a coherent group, and 
were certainly not united in a pro-women agenda.9 Among the male parliamentarians, clerics and 
ex-mujahedin commanders likely to be conservative in religious and social matters were in the 
majority, totalling three-quarters of the male members of the Lower House, according to one 
cautious estimate.10 Religious conservatives chaired five central committees in the House, including 
the Justice and Judiciary, which was central in the Shia law case. The committee was chaired by 
Maulawi Ataullah Ludin, a Sunni Pashtun and high-ranking Hezb Islami official, a movement and 
later a political party known for its Islamic militancy, and currently a key political ally of the 
president. The Speaker of the House, Yunus Qanooni, a (Sunni) Tajik, acted as a broker among 
opposing interests in the legislative process involving the Shia and the EVAW laws. On balance, it 
seems clear that he favoured the conservatives. 
The Shia Personal Status Law 
The 2004 Constitution for the first time stipulated that courts were to apply Shia jurisprudence in 
family matters where both parties are Shia (Article 131). This formed the basis for efforts to draft a 
personal status law, led by the Shia scholar Sheikh Asif Mohseni. A Qizilbash Shia from Kandahar 
with close ties to Iranian religious scholars, Mohseni had a different background from that of most 
of the Afghan Shia population, who belong to the ethnic Hazara minority. Mohseni’s promulgation 
of the law was perceived by many as a bid to position himself as a leader of the Shia population 
through an attempt to shift the primary identification of this group from ethnicity to religion.11 
 
The Minister of Justice, Sarwar Danish, himself a Shia, reportedly shepherded the draft prepared by 
Mohseni’s group through the Ministry of Justice for technical review before sending it to the 
                                                     
9 Andrea Fleschenberg 2009, Afghanistan’s Parliament in the Making. Berlin: Heinrich Böll Stiftung, in collaboration 
with UNIFEM, p. 113. See also A. Wordsworth 2007, A Matter of Interests: Gender and the Politics of Presence in 
Afghanistan's Wolesi Jirga. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). 
10 Fleschenberg, 2009, quoting Thomas Ruttig, see also Andrew Wilder 2005, A House Divided? Analysing the 2005 
Afghan Elections, Kabul: AREU.  
11 Lauryn Oates 2009, A Closer Look. The Policy and Law-Making Process Behind the Shiite Personal Status Law. 
Kabul: AREU. 
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Parliament in 2006. Here the draft was buried in committees for almost three years before being 
reported out to the floor and passed in early 2009. The slow passage reflected in part the opposition 
from a small but determined number of liberal parliamentarians who worked with civil society 
organizations to gain time to remove some of the most objectionable features of the bill. More 
important, there was concern among the Sunni religious scholars that a separate law for Shias would 
diminish the position of Sunni jurisprudence as the predominant Sharia source of legislation in the 
country. If passed, it would be the first law in Afghanistan’s history based solely on Shia 
jurisprudence. At the same time, unrelated disputes involving the largest Shia group, the Hazaras, 
erupted over other matters. Conflict between Hazara farmers and Pashtun nomads over access to 
land, and disagreement over quota representation for Pashtun nomads in the Parliament, paralysed 
parliamentary proceedings for almost one month. In this situation, the parliamentary leadership was 
reluctant to bring to the floor a bill that might accentuate ethno-religious divides. 
 
The delay gave the opponents time to organize. The most public and politically visible opposition 
formed around a few women parliamentarians and a civil society organization who opposed it on 
grounds of human rights, women’s rights and liberal interpretations of Sharia. An additional process 
was initiated by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), which engaged 
Kateb University, a private university influenced by Hazara religious scholars, to review the bill. 
The opponents succeeded in modifying the proposed law in three priority areas: raising the legal age 
of marriage (from “minor”, taken to mean 9 for girls, to 16 for girls and 18 for boys) the age at 
which the father can claim custody of children after divorce (raised from 2 to 7 for boys and 7 to 9 
for girls) and giving the wife greater freedom of movement outside the house. The opponents had a 
much longer list of proposed amendments – a shortlist of 17 and a wish-list of 96 changes, 
including the conjugal obedience item – but a powerful Sunni leader and ex-mujaheddin, Abdul 
Rasul Sayaff, who had been an initial opponent of the law, cut the discussion short. After his 
intervention, the Lower House voted to approve the bill as a package without further debate on 7 
February 2009. So apparently did the Upper House a little later,12 and the bill went to President 
Hamid Karzai for signature. 
 
The opponents of the bill made no major effort to solicit international support until after it had been 
approved by the Lower House. When the bill then was moving through the final stages of approval, 
however, some MPs and civil society approached internationals actors. An ad hoc coalition of 
Afghan opponents, Western donors and UN organizations started to meet in February and March to 
assess strategies for further modifying the bill. At this point, items of priority were provisions 
governing polygamy and the wife’s obedience to her husband. However, international actors 
hesitated to take a strong stand, for several reasons. 
 
First, the politics of the case were complicated. Since the Shia elite, including the Minister of 
Justice, supported the law, some internationals feared being perceived as standing in the way of 
Shia desire for a separate law and thereby opposing minority rights. In Parliament, sectarian lines 
were strongly evident. Some Shia MPs openly stated “this is our law” and asked Sunni MPs not to 
intervene. All Shia women MPs voted for it, and Shia women activists were told not to spoil this 
opportunity for the Shia community to get their own law. Specific issues could be sorted out later, 
they were told. Opponents were also told that their opposition was un-Islamic – a serious charge 
that could imply blasphemy or apostasy.  
 
There were tacit political understandings and bargains. Sayaff’s eventual endorsement of the law 
was premised on a rejection of the rights of Sunni parliamentarians to debate its content, and 
effectively signalled an arrangement in which Sunni and Shia actors would recognize each other’s 
                                                     
12 The government maintains that the bill was finally passed on 22 February, but there is no record of the Upper House 
discussing it on that day or any other day.  
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exclusive authority on their respective jurisprudence. The implication was to preclude debate across 
sectarian lines in Parliament on any law with religious associations. Conservative Sunni MPs 
supported the bill on the basis of this understanding and after it had been made clear there would be 
no separate Shia courts and a provision for temporary marriage (inimical to Sunni jurisprudence) 
had been removed. Yet many of these MPs were brought to believe they were voting for an 
advisory document rather than a law. In a bargain of a different kind, rumours circulated that Karzai 
and Mohseni had made a deal whereby the latter would “deliver” the Shia vote for Karzai in the 
2009 presidential election, in return for Karzai’s support for the bill.  
 
The UN itself was divided over how to respond. Whereas some officials – notably within UNIFEM 
– advocated a strong stance against problematic aspects of the law, others within the UN system 
argued that the issue was too sensitive, and called for a lessening of UN activity on the issue to 
avoid “destabilization”. International officials on the Kabul human rights network – a group of 
human rights advisors organized around the EU and the UN – asked themselves if it were wise for 
international actors to get involved in this thicket of thorny issues – and if so, how should it be 
done? They had earlier expended human rights capital on religious issues by opposing verdicts on 
blasphemy and apostasy, each time causing a massive public outcry and controversy. 
 
Second, the process surrounding the drafting of the law was extremely complicated and opaque, 
making advocacy for change exceedingly difficult. Lack of knowledge constrained the Afghan 
opponents of the bill, and even more so the internationals. UNAMA had produced a preliminary 
translation of the bill, but there was no authoritative translation until April 2009, well after it had 
been passed by the Parliament and signed by President Karzai. Indeed, translation was no simple 
matter. The bill was a complicated legal corpus of 249 clauses, with numerous terms and concepts 
in Arabic. USAID had a dozen experts working for two weeks to produce an authoritative 
translation. Although international concern would be justified in terms of international human rights 
provisions, including CEDAW (which Afghanistan had signed in 2003), some donors felt that 
ignorance of Shia jurisprudence was a constraining factor. The opaqueness of the Afghan political 
process and the failure of Western governments to invest in long-term country expertise (including 
language resources) meant that the internationals had only limited information that was verifiable. 
By late March 2009, when the EU-UN network of international human rights advisors had moved to 
a more active stance, they did do not know which version of the law had been adopted by the 
Parliament. In fact, they did not have an authoritative translation, or even a copy of the law itself. 
They did not know whether Karzai had signed it or not, or even whether it was now a law (the 
chairman of the House Justice Committee said it was only an advisory opinion for the Supreme 
Court). To complicate matters further, the UN community remained divided. 
 
At this point, unknown sources leaked a UNIFEM document assessing the law to the international 
press. The debate entered the Western public realm with consequent loss of nuancing. International 
headlines proclaimed that the law legalized rape in marriage, citing a provision on conjugal 
obedience that required the wife to submit to sexual intercourse once every fourth night (Article 
132). Information landing on the desk of a European foreign minister said the law sanctioned rape, 
house arrest and paedophilia. The UNIFEM document was leaked to coincide with the opening of a 
major international meeting on Afghanistan in The Hague on 31 March, called by the US 
government to solicit allied support for stronger involvement in Afghanistan. News of the law 
created public outrage in NATO member countries, given their formal commitment to promote 
democracy and human rights in Afghanistan. Western official reactions were predictable. With the 
credibility of the international mission at risk of being undermined in the eyes of their populations, 
NATO governments issued strong statements condemning the law.  
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Faced with a storm of public international protest, Karzai at first withdrew the law, claiming 
technical reasons and that he had not read it. He then announced that the Ministry would review 
the law and amend any articles in contradiction with Sharia or the Constitution.  
 
The stronger international stance had also emboldened some of the Afghan opponents of the law. 
Several Shia women not connected to the parliament or the core opposition staged a public protest. 
It was supported by Hazara leaders opposed to the influence of Mohseni and his suspected ambition 
to take credit for delivering the country’s first law for the Shia minority. The demonstration 
dispersed in the face of strong counter-demonstrations organized by Shia clerics linked to Mohseni, 
who accused the women of being anti-Islamic, Western agents and prostitutes. 
 
In the months that followed, Afghan women and civil society organizations, the UN and concerned 
embassies met repeatedly to agree on strategies for influencing the review process of the law that 
had been announced by the Minister of Justice. Groups of Afghan women, including civil society 
activists and MPs, met several times with government officials to follow up the review. But with the 
Afghan government playing its cards close to its chest – the Minister of Justice was reportedly 
managing the review in person – it proved difficult for these actors to access and provide input to 
the process. An amended law was presented by the MOJ in early July. The revisions included 
changes in language relating to sexual obedience, but these and other changes were only minor, and 
were seen as insufficient for the core opposition from the Parliament and civil society that had 
fought the bill from the start. Members of this coalition wrote an open letter to President Karzai 
expressing their concern. The amended law, they argued, failed to take into consideration their 
suggestions and as a result remained problematic on many issues, particularly relating to polygamy, 
women’s rights to work and sexual obedience. Nevertheless, the bill was signed by the President on 
19 July in the presence of some women critics of the law. At that point, some groups took a more 
positive stance. Most notably, the AIHCR issued a statement declaring that the efforts of civil 
society to bring the necessary changes to the law had been successful.  
The EVAW law  
The EVAW law originated in 2005 in the Afghan EVAW Commission, established by the Ministry 
of Women’s Affairs (MOWA) with support of UNIFEM, to address the problem of violence against 
women. Citing widespread and abhorrent cases of violence against women, the Commission argued 
that there was a need for a new law that could end impunity and provide more severe punishments.  
 
The legal department of MOWA drafted the first version of the bill. The department consulted 
various legal experts, other academics and government officials although concern to protect the law 
as an Afghan / MOWA item resulted in UNIFEM not being included at this point. The MOWA 
draft was officially submitted to the Ministry of Justice (Taqnin section) on the International 
Women’s Day in 2006 amidst national media coverage. A group of Afghan women’s activists, 
however, felt that the bill required significant improvements and started working on a revised draft, 
this time with the technical support of UNIFEM. Following a nine- month process, their draft was 
submitted to the Taqnin through MOWA channels in late 2007. Yet another, parallel, drafting 
process had started in the Parliament’s Women’s Affairs Commission, much to the dismay of the 
contributors to the previous drafts. This draft, a short and declaratory statement, was perceived by 
other participants in the process as an attempt by the main female MP involved to position herself 
politically, at the expense of unity among women activists.  
 
The Taqnin now had three drafts and started work on creating a single version. But while Afghan 
efforts had been multiple and competitive from the start, international involvement – apart from 
UNIFEM support to the civil society draft and assistance to Taqnin in streamlining the three drafts 
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into one – was not evident until late in the process. In early 2009, more than three years after the 
initiative had originated in the EVAW Commission, a joint international-Afghan working group 
received a copy of the draft law through the Taqnin. The working group (Criminal Law Working 
Group, chaired by UNODC) included international legal experts with a mandate to ensure 
consistency and coherence in the area of penal law. Numerous laws had already been introduced, 
often on the initiative of international advisors schooled in their respective national legal traditions, 
creating incoherence in the legal corpus. Presented with a short deadline, the committee could make 
only minor suggestions, most of which were not incorporated by the Taqnin. 
 
By this time, concern over the Shia law was deepening, and women activists and concerned 
internationals started to look to the EVAW law as a possible corrective to its problematic 
provisions. The EVAW law thus appeared on the agenda of the international-national advocacy 
coalition that was lobbying to amend the Shia law. In an evident concession to this group, President 
Karzai signed the EVAW law and the Shia law at the same time, on 19 July 2009.  
 
When the EVAW law was sent back to the Parliament for review and ratification, women activists 
became increasingly worried that it would fail to get past conservative MPs in an acceptable form. 
Some argued that the only viable strategy was to furtively introduce the law in plenary on a day 
when key conservatives were absent. The Women’s Affairs Commission in the Lower House that 
was tasked with leading the process sought instead to develop a consensus by taking the law to the 
Joint Commission composed of representatives of all 18 parliamentary commissions, before 
bringing it to plenary debate.  
 
The parliamentary proceedings were an opening for international experts from the joint working 
group that had tried to modify the draft to re-enter the process. Having secured a copy of the text, 
they became concerned on discovering that technical weaknesses remained. Chief among these 
were a lack of coherence with the broader legal framework and confusion over legal categories. At 
this point, however, the logic of legal professionalism clashed with the logic of politics. 
 
Women activists argued that the purpose of the law was in part political, that is, to bring the 
problem of violence and discrimination against women to political attention and send out a strong 
signal against impunity for such crimes. They also feared that introducing changes at this point 
would complicate the matter, and might provide ammunition to the conservatives, especially if 
opponents could frame the law as a foreign creation. Undoubtedly, there was also a strong sense 
among the women who had worked on the bill for years that this was “their” product and some 
resentment that unsolicited external advice was being offered at such a late stage in the process. As 
a result, repeated efforts by international legal experts to improve the technical language of the law 
did not succeed.  
 
In the Parliament, meanwhile, the atmosphere in the Joint Commission was becoming increasingly 
hostile. Conservative MPs accused women supporters of the law of being anti-family and under 
foreign influence. In the end, meetings were suspended. Those who had worked on the law from the 
beginning now argued that it was better left as a presidential decree, and that the parliamentary 
process should be abandoned. There were concerns that the law would either be rejected or get 
through Parliament only in a severely butchered form. The new situation also revealed a split 
among the women MPs, with the initial backers of the law accusing key members of the Women’s 
Affairs Commission of using the parliamentary ratification process to put their stamp on the law and 
claim credit for delivering it.  
 
The international actors were becoming similarly fatigued over the parliamentary process. Earlier 
attempts to lobby key parliamentarian powerbrokers on the bill had not yielded results, and there 
was a sense that salvaging it as a presidential decree might be better than nothing. By spring 2010, 
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due to the efforts of its original supporters, the EVAW law had been taken off the parliamentary 
agenda for the time being, with its eventual acceptance there uncertain. Having lost patience with 
the long drawn-out process of getting the law past the Parliament, supportive government agencies, 
women’s organizations and donors were preparing to implement its provisions as a presidential 
decree. Scattered reports of prosecutions based on the EVAW law in courts also started to emerge.  
Conclusions and policy implications  
Their different origins and purpose notwithstanding, these two bills affecting the rights of Afghan 
women intersected as they passed through the legislative process. Some policy implications in terms 
of international assistance therefore apply to both, whereas others are specific to one of the two. 
 
In both cases, the nature and timing of assistance was critical. As for the Shia law, Afghan opponent 
were in retrospect somewhat divided as to what would be an appropriate international strategy. 
There was broad agreement that the internationals had an important role to play in lobbying key 
political actors such as Karzai, the Minister of Justice Sarwar Danish and House Speaker Qanooni. 
Low-key and low-profile international aid was best. When that failed to produce the desired results, 
Afghan opponents were divided as to the value of public loudspeaker diplomacy. In one sense, it 
worked, in that it brought the problematic features of the bill into sharp political focus and led to 
some revisions. However, the most significant amendments had already been secured by the Afghan 
opponents of the law, so the additional revisions made after the international outcry were minor.  
 
In any case, what finally moved Western powers to take a strong stance on the Shia law were not 
the pleas of Afghan opponents of the law, but concern in Western home ministries and 
organizational headquarters. That came about when the international media presented the bill in 
sensationalist terms. The level of international public diplomacy at that point increased 
dramatically.  
 
By openly moving to the frontline of Afghan public debate, Western political figures to some extent 
alienated segments of the Afghan opposition to the law. Once the issue had become framed and 
strongly polarized alongside foreign vs Islamic/ Afghan fault-lines, many Afghan actors found a 
middle-ground position untenable, for various reasons. Some disengaged from the issue. Others 
declared themselves satisfied with the revised law, leaving those internationals actors who had came 
out strongly to oppose the law both puzzled and embittered.  
 
As for the EVAW law, the timing was clearly a problem. Keen to protect the law as an Afghan 
product, key Afghan actors sought to limit international technical assistance. When that was 
offered, unsolicited, at a late stage in the process, the Afghan proponents of the bill rejected what 
was essentially sound international advice from a technical perspective. But the emphasis on 
Afghan “ownership” was also a way to protect the bill in what had become an increasingly 
polarized legislative and political climate.  
 
In both cases, but especially with regard to the Shia law, lack of knowledge constrained the 
international actors from providing timely and appropriate assistance. Admittedly, the sheer 
complexity of the Shia law made it difficult for even legal scholars of Shia jurisprudence to assess 
the text. As for the international actors, having made limited investments in developing relevant 
language, religious and cultural skills, their choice of assistance strategies was basically between 
passive-non-interference (chosen early in the process) and public diplomacy (in the latter phase). As 
regards the EVAW law, greater sensitivity to the underlying political logic might have made for 
better working relations between the international experts and the Afghan coalitions working to 
promote the law. 
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The processes surrounding both bills highlight the problems of law-making in Afghanistan after 
2001. The legislative process in general has been characterized by a high degree of fragmentation. 
Individuals and smaller groups (both Afghans and international advisors) who sought to secure the 
adoption of “their laws” have dominated the process. Often, laws have been drafted in their entirety 
by actors outside the Afghan government, who then used political pressure and relied on favours to 
ensure the adoption of the law. While such strategies are part of legislative process everywhere, in 
Afghanistan they have become paramount. The result has been incoherence and inconsistency in the 
legal corpus as a whole.  
 
The ad hoc approach to lawmaking has also contributed to an opaque legislative process which puts 
a premium on informal connections with the executive and key powerbrokers to influence the 
outcome. In the cases considered here, the lack of transparency and accountability made it difficult 
for the parties concerned to obtain even basic information about the legislative process, and 
seriously hampered both international and Afghan attempts to review and promote changes in the 
Shia law. Many international actors clearly wanted to see the EVAW law passed, even in an 
imperfect form. In this case the informal channels worked to their advantage, as combined 
international and Afghan pressure succeeded in getting the bill passed as a presidential decree and, 
later, prevented it from being rejected in Parliament (at least for the time being). In the case of the 
Shia law, by contrast, those mechanisms worked against both Afghan and international actors who 
tried to secure amendments. Arguably, they would have been better served by a transparent and 
rule-bound legislative process.  
 
The legislative histories of the two laws also illuminate the contradictions set in motion when 
significant amounts of external funding are invested in supporting or building a country’s civil 
society. The end result might be that technocratic requirements for programme design and reporting 
take priority over preparing local civil society for national political mobilization for social change, 
even to the point where the former function may impede or override the latter. At least equally 
important, competition for funding within civil society tends to undermine coalition-building and 
information-sharing. Such dilemmas are by no means unique to Afghanistan. However, in the case 
of Afghanistan, where external funding has been exceptionally large and often delivered at a pace 
that has outstripped local capacities ravaged by decades of war, such effects have been particularly 
evident.  
 
The current political field significantly shaped the strategies available for both Afghans and 
international actors – both groups had to take care to avoid accusations of foreign influence. Undue 
foreign intervention in the country’s affairs is a common concern that resonates strongly locally, 
and can severely discredit those who stand accused of either exercising or being complicit in it. In 
this sense, ownership becomes a litmus test for political legitimacy rather than an organizing 
principle for sustainability.  
 
The authority in any given case to demarcate and defend local ownership vis- à-vis “the foreigners” 
– as the international presence is collectively know – is not given, but fought over in every case. It 
follows that those whose ownership international actors should relate to and ideally attain is by no 
means unambiguous. As one UN worker asked in regard to considerations of ownership: who owns 
the Shia law? Was it Shia clerics, women, the Shia minority or the Afghan population more 
general? Ownership as an ideal of international aid practice typically masks the political 
implications of such questions. 
 
Several policy implications flow from this case study of Afghanistan:  
Greater investment in relevant language, cultural and religious skills would enhance the 
international community’s choice of assistance strategies.  
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Greater coordination of international assistance to legal reform would have helped to streamline the 
process of revising the law, produce more clarity and less conflict in the reform process, and create 
greater coherence in the body of law.  
 
International and national support for greater transparency and accountability in the legislative 
process are essential to open up space for parties concerned to access the process. This might entail 
a trade-off between substance and process – that is, between employing informal lobbying for 
desired outcomes and overall support for an open and rule-governed legislative process.  
 
In promoting legal reform, international actors should give greater consideration to enable local 
civil society to mobilize politically for social change. This helps to create genuine local ownership 
and reduces the conflictual effect that a more direct international role is likely to produce, above all 
in sensitive religious and cultural issues. 
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Haiti 
AMELIE GAUTHIER and MADALENA MOITA13 
 
 
Haiti lacks a judicial body that is independent from the government, with its own budget to 
administer the courts, independent powers to nominate judges and magistrates and to monitor their 
conduct14. This makes the judiciary weak and vulnerable to political interference. For example, the 
Minister of Justice applied disciplinary sanctions to five magistrates, for presumed involvement in 
corruption. Three of the sanctions were revoked and two others were suspended.15 However, his 
actions have also been interpreted as interference by the government in the judicial branch, 
accentuating the need for a truly independent body. There have also been conflicts of authority 
between former Prime Minister Michèle Pierre Louis and the President over the control of the 
Ministry of Justice.16 Controlling the judicial system is a powerful asset for political leaders, and the 
sector has become a politicized and corrupt arena.  
 
A recurrent theme in interviews with both internationals and national representatives is the lack of 
critical infrastructure for the judicial system: Haiti’s courts are run-down, with little office furniture, 
let alone such essential working tools as the civil and penal codes in French and Creole, or 
computers and archives to store the trial information. Particularly acute is the lack of trained human 
resources. The complete “set” of legal actors – judges, court personnel, lawyers, prosecutors, civil 
servants – in the ministry is often not prepared for their responsibilities, and individuals are often 
appointed on the basis of personal or political ties. In some remote areas, judges are unable to read 
or write. This is a general problem in a country suffering from severe “brain drain” and highly 
dependent on technical expertise.  
 
The administration of justice and the functioning of the courts are hampered by lack of trained 
personnel. Moreover, the tendency to give priority to civil cases over criminal ones leads to long 
periods of pre-trial detention and extremely long court processes. Some NGOs in Haiti are now 
working to gather detailed information about each detainee and the legal procedures they have been 
through. This exercise will help to identify the bottlenecks in the processes of detention, trial and 
judgment, and where in the process the detainee stands. While there have been many reports on the 
problems of the judiciary system, there seem to be major shortcomings in what is written about each 
case, the profiles of the judges involved, and statistical information about the functioning of the 
court. “There is a strong need for case management, court management – all kinds of all 
management.”17  
 
We mention these shortcomings here because they are important for assessing Haitians’ perceptions 
of the justice sector, and thus the state itself: Access to justice is virtually non-existent for the 60% 
of the rural population. Instead, conflicts are typically resolved locally, and people place their trust 
either in the police chief, the locally elected municipal representative, or a Catholic, Protestant or 
voodoo priest. Although it is difficult to define these means of resolution as typical “informal 
                                                     
13 Independent Consultants. 
14 Data collection for this case study was done prior to the earthquake on January 12, 2010.  
15 “Sweeping Clean the Judicial System: RNDDH encourages the Ministry of Justice and Public Security to continue 
cleansing the system”, Press Release, 9 April 2009, Haiti.  
16 Interview with lawyer, Port-au-Prince, 31 March 2009. 
17 Interview with an international NGO representative, Port-au-Prince, 1 April 2009. 
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justice” as known from African states,18 the methods of conflict resolution in these rural areas are 
definitely outside the official legal parameters set by the civil and penal codes. Rulings are often 
based on common sense, grounded in cultural and local contexts.  
 
The feelings and sentiments expressed by Haitians towards the formal judiciary system are, not 
surprisingly, predominantly those of fear and distrust. It is common knowledge that judges, despite 
being civil servants of the state with a responsibility to serve the people, often serve their own 
interests. There is little in the way of professional ethics and principles that guide the judges in their 
work, and they are frequently accused of corruption. As one lawyer in Port-au-Prince put it to us 
during an interview: “There is heavy competition between magistrates for elitist enrichment, and 
new magistrates are more corrupt than the older magistrates.”19  
Reform plan  
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that justice reform has been made a priority. The basis for 
these reform is the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (DSNCRP)20 of November 2007, 
which sets five priorities for reform: i) Restructuring and modernization of the Ministry of Justice 
and Public Security, ii) Restoration of the judiciary, iii) Improving access to the courts and to an 
efficient court system, iv) Rehabilitation and consistent development of the incarceration system, v) 
Modernization of the legislation.  
 
The DSCRP is the central in that it sets priorities, and most importantly permits donors to work 
within the government’s framework. However it has several limitations. The priorities cover 
virtually everything, and the document does not establish any strategy for achieving the objectives. 
Moreover, all the main donors operate within this framework, with their own plans and strategies 
for reform. Coordination efforts abound, and various mechanisms have been put in place, such as 
table sectorielle, but without serving as effective focal points for coordinated action.  
 
The major international players in the area of justice reform in Haiti are MINUSTAH, UNDP, the 
OIF, NCSC, ILAC, EU, Canada, and the United States. Despite a certain division of labour, there is 
a lack of consensus among donors as to the preferred model for reform (French, Latin American, 
North American). Haitians are also deeply divided, and it is difficult to see the contours of anything 
resembling a broad political consensus on how to move forward. The presidential working group on 
the follow-up of the reform, which works independently from the Ministry of Justice and the 
various others commissions each with their different teams, is but one indication of the structural 
problems involved in efforts to reform Haiti’s justice sector.21 This background forms the 
institutional and political setting for such reform efforts, and it should be borne in mind as we move 
on to analyse the various actors and their perceptions of ownership. 
                                                     
18 African informal justice systems are generally characterized by strong tribal organizational structures, where the 
hierarchies are clearly defined, the supremacy of the chief is recognized and his decision is respected.  
19 Interview with a lawyer, Port-au-Prince, 31 March 2009. 
20 Document Stratégique National pour la Croissance et la Réduction de la Pauvreté. 
http://www.mpce.gouv.ht/dsncrpfinal.pdf 
21 The various commissions are as follows: Presidential Commission “Groupe de travail sur la reforme de la justice”, 
Presidential Commission “Groupe de travail sur la reforme de la Constitution” (now terminated; results have been 
presented to the Parliament), Presidential Commission “Groupe de travail sur la modernisation du code pénal et du code 
d’instruction criminelle”, Commission under the Ministry of Justice and Public Security “Commission Nationale de 
Détention”, Commission under the Ministry of Justice and Public Security “Commission sur la refonte des codes et de la 
législation”(not yet operating).  Source: internal UNDP document.  
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Perceptions of ownership 
Donors  
The policy documents of all major donors identify “local ownership” as a fundamental principle. 
Given the status accorded to this principle in policy documents, it is surprising to find that there is 
little in the way of specific guidelines for practical implementation. Donors typically present a 
standard framework – for example, the five-page guidelines from the European Commission 
concerning Rule of Law policies22 – usually prepared by experts in Brussels or elsewhere. Similarly, 
USAID has established procedures for its officers to elaborate country analysis in order to set 
specific Rule of Law priorities. Again the concept of ownership appears: “the post-conflict 
rebuilding process is challenging and complex. It requires strategies that promote local ownership 
and financial sustainability, and that develop local capacity quickly.” 23 The Guide offers 
recommendations on how to best get information on the country’s political and historical context so 
that USAID officers may perform a correct assessment of the justice sector. However, the Guide 
goes on to say: “if the rule of law is a universal principle, then supporting the rule of law is not 
necessarily imposing foreign ideas on a society”. This is a frequent but dubious operationalization 
of local ownership: Peacebuilders do make an effort to acquire specific country knowledge in order 
to better understand how to promote local ownership, but all this takes place within a framework 
where there are certain standards, values and policy principles that are held to be universal. 
 
Here the UNDP differs in having a longer history of emphasizing ownership; it also has much 
clearer guidelines for how its staff are to establish or promote local ownership. A UNDP report on 
strengthening the rule of law in post-conflict settings notes that: 
 
At the country-level, UNDP responds to requests by Host Governments and derives its 
country-specific mandate from Standard Basic Agreements (SBA) between the Host 
Government and UNDP. Thus, as a development agency, UNDP Rule of Law 
programming is not only guided by national ownership, as a principle, but this principle 
is also embedded in UNDP execution modalities. Nationally-owned needs assessments 
are central to UNDP programming design. Partnership and coordination with national 
partners is essential to this process.24 
 
Generally, however, donor literature on ownership is ambiguous when we move from the level of 
policy to the level of implementation at the country level. In effect, country-level operations 
correspond to a difficult, on-going translation effort, where donors’ principles encounter developing 
countries’ demands. Here, experts who benefit from a deeper knowledge of the country are 
expected to perform elastic manoeuvres to make policies from headquarters fit in with reality and 
vice-versa – what Schlichte and Veit call “policy bending”25. Or, as one donor representative put it, 
“Policies towards fragile states need to be much more flexible” – reflecting a general view among 
peacebuilders about the challenges involved in mediating between and aligning the world of policy 
and the world of political practice in Haiti.26 
 
                                                     
22 Programming Guide for Strategy Papers, Rule of Law (January 2009) available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/F22_judicialsystem_fin_en.pdf  
23 Ibid. 
24 UNDP, Strengthening the Rule of Law in Conflict- and Post-Conflict Situations. A Global UNDP Programme for 
Justice and Security 2008-2011, available at www.undp.org/cpr/documents/jssr/rule_of_law_final.pdf. 
25 Klaus Schlichte and Alex Veit 2007, “Coupled Arenas: Why state-building is so difficult”, Humboldt University 
Berlin: Working Papers Micropolitics no. 3, 2007, available at: http://www.ipw.uni-
magdeburg.de/inipw_media/schlichte/mikropolitik/03_07_Coupled_Arenas.pdf. 
26 Interview with a donor agency representative, Port-au-Prince, 30 March 2009. 
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In interviewing those operating in Haiti to help build peace, the authors were frequently asked to 
explain the meaning of the concept of “local ownership”‒ which would indicate that ownership 
does not form part of the framework or culture of peacebuilding applied by peacebuilders in 
performing their tasks. In interviews with donors, alignment with the DSNCRP was mentioned as a 
sign or proof that they did recognize and live by the principle of ownership. Specifically, 
interviewees deemed “ownership” to be present when one or more of the following obtained: the 
government’s signature of a specific agreement; the fact that the government would contribute part 
of the resources (human or financial); that the government would assure future continuity of the 
project.  
 
Note that these criteria see ownership as an outcome, not a process or a point of departure in the 
sense of it being a question of the government recognizing or appreciating “the benefits of the 
policies and to accept the responsibility for them”27. In fact, however, the basic instrument for “local 
ownership” mentioned by donors – the DSNCRP – is by several national actors seen as the product 
of an unsuccessful executive branch policy of the 2007 government of Jacques-Édouard Alexis, 
later removed from power. Haitians do not recognize the document as a “Haitian” plan but as one 
that was externally conceived, or, at best a “mixed Haitian and international community” plan.28 
Furthermore, very few local actors recognize the adequacy of the document, and the current 
government hardly accepts it as the basic plan for elaborating public policies. This state of affairs 
has arguably been exacerbated by the report authored by Paul Collier for the UN, in which new and 
different priorities are proposed.29 
 
Considering “local ownership” successful and/or important when it follows an “orphaned” plan like 
the DSNCRP raises the question of whose ownership is being granted. Governments have changed 
frequently in Haiti, and between these there have been no overarching national plans or strategies. 
Today, there is no one who really assumes responsibility for implementing the DSNCRP. Instead, it 
serves as a useful point of departure for internal donor coordination efforts. This lack of continuity 
in government policy certainly makes securing local ownership even more challenging ‒ especially 
since international donors operate with plans and formal constraints that make it almost impossible 
to shift priorities in accordance with new government plans in Haiti.  
Government  
When asked, government officials showed little or no knowledge or understanding of the principle 
of ownership. When asked about specifics – for example, whether efforts to reform the justice 
sector were driven, controlled, designed by donors or by Haitians – they would typically say that 
final decisions are, ultimately, in the hands of Haitians. The government engages in an ongoing 
dialogue with donors to select from a menu provided by external actors, be it the UN or others. 
However, several interviewees from donors and the UN said that negotiations with external actors 
as pursued until the point where they manage to persuade the Haitian government to accept their 
proposals. Thus, while Haitians may see themselves as the main decisions-makers, international 
actors see themselves persuading the Haitians to accept their position.  
 
Lacking financial resources for adequate governing, the government tends to accept donors’ 
conditions and suggestions so that there will be money coming into the system.30 In Haiti, this 
                                                     
27 James M. Boughton and Alex Mourmouras 2002, Is Policy Ownership an Operational Concept?, IMF Working Paper, 
p.3, available at: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp0272.pdf  
28 Interview with high-level government official, Port-au-Prince, 3 April 2009. 
29 Paul Collier 2009, Haiti: From Natural Catastrophe to Economic Security. A Report for the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, January 2009, available at: http://www.focal.ca/pdf/haiticollier.pdf 
30 As Haiti generates only around 11% of its GDP in revenue, the country is heavily dependent on external financing. 
Country Report, The Economist Intelligence Unit, November 2008, p. 8. 
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results in a power struggle between international actors, who have the resources and are pressured 
to see results, and national political leaders, who must balance conflicting demands from their 
different supporters. This dynamic corresponds to what Barnett and Zuercher call “co-optive 
peacebuilding”, where “local elites and peacebuilders negotiate a peacebuilding programme that 
reflects the desire of peacebuilders for stability and the legitimacy of peacebuilding and the desire 
of local elites to ensure that reforms do not threaten their power base”. 31 In contrast with a 
predominance of either international or local actors (respectively a cooperative or a captured type 
of peacebuilding) we would suggest this formula may, in many cases, be preferred over the 
alternative, since it does not challenge or interfere with the relations between the state and society 
that determines the state’s legitimacy. In the case of Haiti, however, there are good reasons for 
concluding that it is precisely the character of the relation between state and society that must be 
transformed in order for a more stable and legitimate state to emerge. 
Civil society 
Interviews with civil society organizations (CSOs) showed that their priorities in terms of Rule of 
Law differed systematically from those set by the DSNCRP and the external actors. When asked 
what the priorities should be, CSO representatives would express concern about social and 
economic rights, gender issues, food security etc.‒ points often absent from the rule-of-law 
programmes designed by external actors. Moreover, they noted that a key obstacle to reform in the 
judicial system is the vicious circle of impunity and corruption that erodes institutions’ legitimacy 
and credibility. Oddly enough, donors seem to have generally avoided these issues.  
 
CSOs feel marginalized from reform efforts in the judicial system, noting that they have rarely been 
consulted by national or international actors during the definition of priorities. Some donors stressed 
that they supported the government on the condition that civil society was consulted, but the space 
and mechanisms for dialogue between the state and organized citizenry are extremely weak. In fact, 
many CSOs do not want to collaborate with the government at all, seeing their role much more as 
an opposition to the regime than as a strategic partner working towards commonly agreed 
objectives. This tendency, in turn, has to do with sub-optimal democratic practices and historically 
established and deep-rooted political division. For Haitians, the primary frame of reference for 
solidarity and burden-sharing is the family, after years of dictatorship and the ensuing survival-logic 
that have led CSOs to compete for funds from international donors with an eye to securing financial 
rewards.  
 
In terms of rule of law and the justice reform, MINUSTAH (the United Nations Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti) is seen as collaborating closely with USAID. MINUSTAH is viewed as 
privileging contact with the government as its main partner, while largely avoiding civil society. 
And although working with non-state actors is emphasized in the MINUSTAH mandate,32 
significant organizational and practical constraints seem to block day-to-day interaction with civil 
society. In general terms, different donors employ very different practices as regards their 
interaction with the government. Some donors referred to holding regular meetings with local 
authorities in an effort to reach consensus on policy implementation, while other donors said that 
they preferred to integrate their own officials into the work to be done by the Haitian state. The 
UNDP, for example, usually emplaces an official working with national judicial authorities.  
                                                     
31 Michael Barnett and Christoph Zuercher 2007, “The Peacebuilder's Contract: How External State-building Reinforces 
Weak Statehood”, available at http://www.polisci.umn.edu/~mirc/paper2006-07/spring2007/barnett&zuercher.pdf, pp.3-4. 
32 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/mandate.html  
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Implementation agents throughout the country 
Throughout Haiti, the UN and other external actors have staff engaged in implementing a range of 
projects and programmes within the justice sector. Interviews with staff engaged in these tasks 
brought out a slightly different interpretation of ownership. Representatives of three major 
institutions – the National Centre for State Courts (NCSC), the International Legal Assistance 
Consortium (ILAC) and the International Francophone Organization (OIF) – appeared to have a 
more acute sense of the importance, and challenges, of securing local ownership. Most of these 
actors had been chosen by donors after responding to a call for proposals and by having experience 
in the field of justice reform in developing countries. As an example, these organizations said that 
they had started projects by first conducting an in-depth diagnosis of the Haitian justice system, 
performed by nationals who would later be integrated into the respective teams. A specific project 
on designing rules in the courts in collaboration with the judges’ association indicates that it may be 
easier to establish ownership on a smaller scale, between professional/technical staff representing 
both external and internal actors, than at the strategic and political level between donors and the 
government.33 The consultation process was held to be central to the governments’ assurance of 
gradually bearing the financial costs of the projects.  
Major Obstacles to Ownership 
Haitians have become accustomed to a heavy presence of international actors. For some, this has 
engendered a passive attitude, while causing frustration and resistance in others. The political elite 
have accumulated knowledge about the functioning of peacekeeping operations, donor interests, and 
good governance reforms. Their interaction with international personnel has facilitated the elements 
of a shared culture and language, making communication and negotiations easier. However, the 
failures of the past and the difficulty of sustaining reform efforts have also generated significant 
frustration and mistrust on both sides.34  
Local limitations 
One crucial factor that limits ownership is local capacity. Young, educated people are often the first 
to leave Haiti, to take up positions abroad. As a result, both the government and civil society 
organizations suffer from severe shortages of qualified human resources. Many interviewees 
mentioned lack of capacity to participate as a serious limitation. This is an important and often 
overlooked aspect of ownership: that local actors themselves may feel that they are unable to 
participate because they lack the necessary educational background or experience. It indicates that 
the often highly technical language of peacebuilding and development may in itself be a barrier to 
entry for local actors. The lack of continuity in government has also proven a major setback in 
reform processes. Perhaps especially in fragile states, ownership is based on individuals rather than 
institutions: New ministers will naturally identify new policies and priorities. However, the absence 
of a functioning state apparatus, and no minimum agreement and national consensus on core 
priorities, leave the plans of external actors vulnerable to changes that often undermine the 
sustainability of reform efforts.  
 
The normal democratic process whereby civil society influences parliamentarians for their vote is 
still dysfunctional in Haiti. Wthout any kind of binding accountability and control mechanisms over 
the government and elected members of parliament, democracy is thwarted. Civil society is 
characterized by its weak capacity to engage and formulate proposals and solutions. These 
                                                     
33 Interview with an implementation agency representative, Port-au-Prince, 1 April 2009. 
34 Civil Society representatives advocated for a change in paradigm from the international community, Presentation in a 
Workshop on Fragile States organized by FRIDE, September 2007, Madrid. 
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structural features are exacerbated by what many see as a political culture focused on personal 
enrichment. As one UN official put it: “The president does not believe in the state”,35 referring to 
the fact that there has been no sustained effort on the part of the President to confront – through a 
reform and strengthening of the justice sector – such problems as narco-traffickers, patronage 
networks and corruption rings.  
External actors 
In the last three years, the government has twice fallen, bringing down the Minister of Justice who 
had worked hand in hand with MINUSTAH on legislation to guarantee the independence of the 
justice system. With a new government and a new minister, MINUSTAH and other external actors 
face a big challenge in trying to secure the support (ownership) by the new government, while 
continuing the reform efforts started under previous governments. Two presidential commissions 
have been created, and two further commissions under the Ministry of Justice, all of which makes 
the challenge of pushing forward on previously agreed upon objectives all the more daunting. The 
international community finds itself trapped into working with personalities, not institutions, and 
sustaining programmes that are often unsuitable or directly unwanted by key actors.  
 
Furthermore, donors face important technical and financial restrictions. There is the timeline 
paradox: the pressure exercised from donors to get quick results that can be measured quantitatively 
(x number of courts repaired, x number of judges trained, etc.) often contradicts or undermines the 
necessary, and slow, work to establish ownership and sustainability of reform efforts. Quite a few 
interviewees argued that ownership has been “sacrificed” for the sake of results.  
 
Accountability and transparency is central to ownership. Many Haitian interviewees emphasized the 
problem that the government is forced to be accountable to donors, whereas accountability to 
Haitian society is less of an issue. The lack of accountability between donors and the local 
population creates not only confusion but also outright resistance. As one Haitian put it: “How 
many more expensive and ineffective projects do we have to put up with?”36  
Policy implications  
Do peacebuilders learn? Many peacebuilders interviewed in Haiti had prior experience from 
working on several missions. Some had in fact been posted to previous missions in Haiti, which 
should help in building knowledge and understanding of Haitian society. However, many 
interviewees commented that internal “turf wars” within MINUSTAH and among the various UN 
entities inhibited learning and flexibility. Moreover, possibilities for individual promotion are very 
much linked to measurable results and outputs, and not to local processes and the sustainability of 
reform efforts. In such an environment, sharing learning experiences (and especially failures) might 
be discouraged.  
 
Evaluations of rule-of-law work in Haiti have pointed out that, in the past, external actors have 
advanced “donor-driven” policies while neglecting interaction with civil society.37 Our analysis 
indicates that knowledge and information about the relationship between the state and its citizens, 
and specifically people’s perceptions of the justice system, should be made integral to any reform 
effort. While ownership is part of the Paris Declaration it still needs to be specified and rendered 
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36 Interview with civil society representative, Port-au-Prince, 13 April 2009. 
37 Jamal Benomar 2001, “Rule of Law Technical Assistance in Haiti: Lessons Learned”, World Bank Conference Co-
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operational.38 Moreover, to the extent that local ownership means that programmes and projects 
should be “initiated by local actors” and/or that they have “local support”, it entails a more 
fundamental re-thinking of donors’ practices of interacting with local actors.39  
 
To be sure, the main issue facing peacebuilders in Haiti is how to grapple with and help to resolve 
the deep divisions within society. The discussion over reforming the penal code is representative: 
whereas some actors advocate complete and immediate modernization, believing that this will bring 
about positive changes in the functioning of courts and that will “trickle down” through society, 
others advocate a more gradual modernization of a few laws and articles so that the country can 
adapt to these changes. Peacebuilders need to take this lack of national consensus on the strategy for 
judicial reform as their point of departure. Fostering wider debate on what strategy to adopt can not 
only help to render reform efforts more sustainable, but the debate itself might well create a more 
genuine sense of local ownership. However, donor definitions of ownership and measures put in 
place to secure it run counter to such slowly evolving processes as a national public debate ‒ donors 
operate with very linear methods of measuring ownership in terms of government contribution, 
signature of official documents, the assumption of financial responsibility when international 
funding terminates.  
 
More attention should be paid to serving Haiti as facilitators rather than as builders, as advisors 
rather than as authoritative experts. 
 
                                                     
38 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/63/43911948.pdf  
39 Laurie Nathan 2007. No ownership, no commitment: a guide to local ownership of security sector reform,University of 
Birmingham. Available at http://www.ssrnetwork.net [accessed 15 October 2007]. 
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Liberia 
MORTEN SKUMSRUD ANDERSEN and OLE JACOB SENDING40 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) 
 
 
We are in a small village in Bong County, Liberia, speaking with the village chief, asking him about 
the rule of law. Quite a few villagers gather around, and we ask about the justice sector in Liberia. 
“Justice? You need to be rich to get justice.” For starters, he tells us, the police are miles away, and 
they won’t do anything unless they are paid some money, ostensibly to cover petrol expenses and to 
provide a little extra cash for a salary of some 90 US dollars a month. If the case goes to court, we 
are told, there is little chance of a fair trial. The judge can easily be paid to rule in one way rather 
than another. According to the chief and the rest of the group in this small village, justice is simply 
not something associated with the laws formulated in Monrovia. Instead, they see traditional 
practices of adjudication and conflict resolution vested in traditional authorities as providing a 
modicum of justice. As a study of local perceptions of the justice system in Liberia recently 
concluded: “Liberians … overwhelmingly believe that the formal justice system falls drastically 
short of expectations, to the point where many believe that the formal system is concerned primarily 
with fees … By contrast, Liberians reported far more satisfaction with access to, the pace of and the 
costs associated with customary justice institutions.”41  
 
This brief illustration provides a useful frame for the subsequent analysis of how the principle of 
ownership is understood and acted upon by external actors as they seek to build peace in Liberia. It 
indicates that the implementation of the rule of law – a hallmark of the prevailing peacebuilding 
model – has not progressed to the extent that large segments of society see it as relevant or 
effective. These villagers did not object to the content of the laws that form the formal legal code. 
What they objected to the lack of equal enforcement. That might indicate that the tension so often 
presumed to exist between liberally oriented peacebuilding strategies and pre-existing values and 
institutions may be overstated. Moreover, it tells us that, in post-conflict settings, it is not so much a 
question of establishing but reforming the rule of law: already established mechanisms for 
upholding some law and order often have greater relevance and legitimacy than efforts focused on 
expanding state capacity. In sum, a lot revolves on how ownership is interpreted and acted upon: 
that impacts not only on the type of peacebuilding strategy to pursue but also on how that strategy is 
sought implemented and through what channels. 
 
How peacebuilding is operationalized at the country level cannot be grasped without considering in 
some detail the institutional set-up of the relationship between external and internal actors. First, 
there is the question of the formal rules and procedures that stipulate how different UN entities – 
UNMIL, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, etc. – are to interact with the national government and other 
actors in the given country. Second, there is the question of the basis from which those engaged in 
peacebuilding think. We will look at each question in turn. On the formal rules and procedures, we 
focus on the UN Peacebuilding Fund established for Liberia. On the cultural and institutional 
aspect, we draw on an extensive set of interviews with UN staff and others in Liberia, to provide 
some ideal-typical interpretations of ownership by “everyday” peacebuilders. 
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Institutional framework for UN peacebuilding  
The UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is one of many multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) within the 
international aid architecture. The Fund is intended to be a “risk taking and catalytic instrument for 
peacebuilding support”42, focused on filling strategic gaps in peacebuilding strategies in selected 
countries, and their implementation. Projects under the PBF may have a duration of maximum 
eighteen months. The Fund is managed by the PBSO under the Secretary General’s authority. 
UNDP is the administrative agent, with responsibility for financial aspects and accounting. Projects 
funded by the Peacebuilding Fund at the country level have a set-up whereby – according to UN 
rules – a UN agency must act as the recipient agency (RA). While the RA must be a UN 
organization, there is in principle no limitation as to who the “implementing partner” might be.  
 
Decisions on who is to receive funding are made by the PBF Joint Steering Committee at the 
country level. In making these decisions, the Steering Committee refers to the national-level 
“Priority Plan” for peacebuilding, which is formulated at the country level, and to the Terms of 
Reference and Rules of Procedure, formulated at UN headquarters in New York. Moreover, a report 
from a “Technical Advisory Panel” on the quality and feasibility of different projects is used. 
Examples of questions in the generic application form are: Is the project explicitly based on Liberia 
PBF Priority Plan? Does the project build capacity within national institutions? Does the project 
promote and ensure national and local ownership? Does the proposal have mechanisms to ensure 
that it is sustained beyond the end date?43  
 
The steering committee for the Fund is co-chaired by the UN resident coordinator/DSRSG and the 
Liberian Minister of Internal Affairs. It includes a further 15 representatives, amongst them USAID, 
the Swedish and US ambassadors, representatives of international NGOs and civil society, and of 
the business community. While nominally representative of both external and internal actors, our 
interviews with members of the committee indicate that significant differences exist among 
members as to their familiarity with the formal rules guiding the Fund and their clout in determining 
which projects are approved. First of all, no representative of Liberian civil society were initially 
part of the committee. When they were included, they were “overwhelmed” by the complex rules 
and procedures that guide the Fund. This was in part because there was “no effort to raise awareness 
of PBF rules and activities” amongst representatives of either national or international NGOs.44 
Second, most members of the steering committee are internationals, which indicates that national 
representatives are at a disadvantage not only in terms of the technical aspects of the Fund but also 
in terms of sheer numbers. Finally, the DSRSG, who co-chairs the Committee, is said to be the 
“most powerful person” in the committee because he can “make things happen”. 
 
The rule that the RA must always be a UN agency may seem trivial, but it has some significant 
effects on the relationship between actors wishing to apply for funds. Interviews with both UN staff 
and NGOs indicate that UN entities in effect became a gatekeeper for applications, since Liberian 
actors cannot apply for funds without the backing of a UN entity. Some interviewees even argued 
that this institutional set-up enables UN agencies to “shoehorn themselves into our projects”.45 In 
our interviews with both recipient agencies and implementers, we heard contradictory stories about 
how a project came into being, in terms of who took the initiative, who persuaded whom, and how 
much one or the other was contributing to the project. For example, a senior UNDP official 
acknowledged that it was the UNDP that had written all of the applications submitted to the PBF 
although the UNDP should only, per the Terms of Reference of the PBF, serve as an 
(administrative) recipient agent (RA). In a nutshell, the institutional set-up of the PBF is such that it 
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43 Liberia Peacebuilding Fund Joint Steering Committee Terms of Reference and Rules of Procedure. 
44 Interview with head of international NGO, Monrovia, 2 October 2009. 
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puts UN entities in a position to select national partners and also to shape the contents of 
applications. Moreover, in the Steering Committee, there is every indication that representatives of 
donors and the UN hold sway, in no small part because of their familiarity with the technical 
aspects of the PBF and because of what they can “make happen” by virtue of representing a UN 
entity.  
 
This institutional set-up also affects the implementation of projects. Quite a few interviewees noted 
that the involvement of Liberian actors in both designing and implementing projects has been very 
low. There have been complaints that the UN recipient agencies are doing most of the 
implementation work by themselves ‒ so much so that a Liberian Minister came to the 
Peacebuilding Secretariat to complain that the UN recipient agencies were doing everything on their 
own.46 According to the terms of reference of the Liberian peacebuilding fund, UN organizations 
are to function as “recipient organization” from the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, where the money for 
the Liberian Peacebuilding Fund comes. Projects are not to be implemented by UN organizations, 
as they are intended to build local capacity and secure local ownership. However, the institutional 
set-up of the PBF seems to undermine these objectives.  
 
For one thing, the Priority Plan for the PBF is to be derived from Liberia’s Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (PRS). This document is to be produced and “owned” by the government. However, the 
production of that part of the PRS that concerns peacebuilding was produced largely by 
international experts. An UNMIL civil affairs officer was hired to “ensure that the PRS was 
conflict-sensitive”. He noted that “…there is a tendency on the part of post-conflict governments, 
because of urgent needs to rebuild, to forget or overlook critical needs regarding post-conflict 
issues. We sat down and identified critical conflict factors in Liberia.”47 The PRS process was 
organized around several working groups, with representatives from various parts of the 
government and from the UN and other donors. When asked whether it was the government that 
took the initiative to establish a working group on peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity, this 
interviewee responded: “No, no, it came from us. Then the government saw the need. … We 
developed several papers on conflict sensitivity for each of the four pillars of the PRS. … It was the 
UN that took the lead in drafting the 10 pages. We said: ‘These are the issues you need to address.’ 
We took the lead. Quite frankly we really did not only have a say. The government lacks capacity 
on conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding.”48 
 
Moreover, the UNDP operates in so-called DEX mode – Direct Execution – in Liberia. The 
underlying reasoning is that in order to have full control over the use of UN funds and to avoid 
corruption and to minimize fiduciary risks, UN agencies are not to transfer funds to the national 
authorities and then let them distribute money according to their priorities. As one UNDP employee 
put it, “the UN doesn’t want money to pass through the ministries – except to the Ministry of 
Finance, where people from PricewaterhouseCoopers are advisors”.49 Despite an idealized vision of 
cooperation and ownership, there is a lack of trust in the government, and no money is going 
through them.50 The DEX mode, then, is motivated by fiduciary concerns. Only when the UN trusts 
national authorities to spend and use funds in accordance with established rules and regulations do 
they shift towards NEX mode – National Execution. Admittedly, there are good reasons to be 
concerned with corruption. Our point here is simply to note that DEX renders efforts to establish 
ownership much more difficult. 
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48 Ibid. 
49 Interview with UNPBF staff, Monrovia, 2 May 2009. 
50 Interview with UNPBF staff, Monrovia, 2 May 2009. 
CMI REPORT LEARNING TO BUILD A SUSTAINBLE PEACE R 2010: 4 
26 
 
The institutional interface between external and local actors – here exemplified by the set-up of the 
PBF in Liberia – is heavily tilted towards external actors in terms not only of financial control, but 
also as to the selection of whom to support, and the substantive content of specific projects. This 
bias should not be exaggerated, however: government agencies often do have considerable power in 
peacebuilding projects, and concerning the allocation of funds. Nevertheless, this institutional 
interface has considerable implications for the likelihood of establishing genuine ownership for 
peacebuilding efforts.  
Perceptions and the practice of ownership  
A central issue regarding ownership is the question of who develops the project proposals, concept 
notes and overall strategies within the above system. When asked directly about the extent to which 
UNDP took a hands-on approach in developing proposals for the PBF, a UNDP official quipped, 
“Well, of course we are! We’re development professionals. That’s what we do.”51 As we discuss in 
some detail below, such views are not uncommon, indicating that those who represent the UN in 
post-conflict settings identify themselves as professional authorities on what constitutes proper 
peacebuilding strategies. Very schematically, we may say that the substantive content of 
peacebuilding is defined “top‒down” (deductively) from a set of liberal principles stipulating how 
(ideal) societies should be organized and governed, and not “bottom‒up” (inductively), where 
knowledge about what works is generated from actual experience.52  
 
This impulse to do rather than support or facilitate, to define plans and to tell government officials 
what they should do in order to build a peaceful, liberal democratic state is closely linked to several 
standard phrases that recur in the discourse on peacebuilding and state failure. It has to do with how 
ownership – despite being hailed as a foundational principle – is typically subordinated to 
institutionalized practices for peacebuilding. As Donais has noted, “In practice (...) local ownership 
in peacebuilding contexts has come to be less about respecting local autonomy and more about 
insisting that domestic political structures take responsibility for – ownership over – the 
implementation of a pre-existing (and externally-defined) set of policy prescriptions.”53 Still, we 
need to ask: how do peacebuilders reflect on, define and approach ownership in practice? 
 
A general finding from our interviews with peacebuilders representing different UN entities and 
other donors is that societies emerging from conflict lack the motivation, capacity, responsibility or 
accountability to govern effectively and legitimately. It is the absence of these key traits that is often 
invoked to explain why ownership is a conditional right and why it is so difficult to establish in 
practice. We discuss each of these traits in turn. 
 
Lack of motivation and lack of responsibility: A “lack of motivation” among local representatives is 
often seen as something that hampers the establishment of genuine local ownership. It is sometimes 
even seen as an expression of cultural differences. In one interview it was noted that it was difficult 
to work together with Liberians in UNMIL, in the government, with local contractors, and in 
training the police because, it was argued, they seemed to lack motivation to perform the designated 
tasks.54 A senior UNMIL official put it bluntly: “The government set the priorities, and we respect 
that very profoundly. Actually, we would have liked to see a stronger involvement from the 
government. We ended up doing most of the work.” Another UN official noted that they had to be 
very persistent in getting their local counterparts take on responsibility: “We have to talk to them 
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about the national security systems, to make sure that they set up these systems.”55 A third argued 
that ownership is and should be conditional on responsibility. Asked about the challenge of securing 
ownership, the official said: “Well, with ownership comes responsibility. Often, they [Liberians] 
don’t take it.”56 What can explain this (perceived) “lack of motivation and responsibility”? In 
response to the claims that the locals lack motivation, one local NGO expressed that international 
organizations often set up meetings, and ask for cooperation, but that the internationals always end 
up carrying out all the work, relegating the local NGO to the sidelines. “Cooperation” is always 
one-sided, the respondent argued, and added that the sheer quantity of regulations, assessments and 
routines was discouraging for local actors not accustomed to such ways of operating.57  
 
It might seem that heavy international involvement without proper consideration for local 
involvement can be one of the causes of what is seen as lack of motivation and perhaps 
unwillingness to take on responsibility. A clear expression of this came during an interview with a 
government deputy minister. When asked about ongoing projects in his ministry, he eventually 
heaved a sigh, and instead referred us to an international consultant working in the ministry, saying 
that that person would know a lot more about what was going on in the ministry than he did 
himself.58  
 
Lack of consultation and involvement: Ownership is often defined as a right – as an 
operationalization of state autonomy derived from the institution of sovereignty. In this view, 
ownership means involvement in setting the agenda and priorities from the moment that hostilities 
cease. One Liberian politician expressed this view as follows: “Rather than starting with the people, 
and how they feel about decentralization and what kind of decentralization they want, you begin 
with trying to negotiate their view into a UN document that becomes very attractive because it 
comes with a 15 million dollar fund. So you are starting on a wrong footing. In the document, they 
will say ‘we will do everything to ensure local ownership’. Well, you begin to defeat it right from 
the start!”59 A milder version of this argument also resonated amongst some UN staff, as when it 
was argued that ownership is not given priority within the UN system, and that the organization is 
often far too arrogant about its own ability to deal with (particularly local) issues, without paying 
attention to actually “being of service” or “sitting in the back seat”.60 
 
Lack of capacity: Lack of capacity was the most frequently heard explanation given for why 
ownership was difficult to establish in practice. The argument is that real ownership cannot be 
established before “the people are ready” to govern and to assume responsibility. In effect, this 
interpretation sees ownership as the outcome of the efforts of external actors. One interviewee 
expressed this view very strongly, arguing that the country must be rebuilt in line with international 
standards. Ownership is established in Liberia, he argued, but only to the degree that it can be at this 
point in time. Ownership is responsibility, and to assume responsibility you have to be “mature”. 
There must be “rules and regulations to govern them”;61 the critical point for capacity building is 
when “they can decide what is good for them”.62 According to this view, ownership without 
capacity is a rather “hollow” concept, used for strategic reasons by national counterparts in order to 
acquire resources and money and to strengthen their position. Ownership as consultation and 
participation given a set of international standards is a good idea, but ownership in terms of actual 
                                                     
55 Interview with senior UNMIL official, Monrovia, 4 May 2009. 
56 Interview with UNMIL official, Monrovia 2 October, 2009.  
57 Interview with staff from Liberian Peacebuilding NGO, Monrovia, 1 May 2009. 
58 Interview with a deputy minister, Ministry of Justice, Monrovia, 1 May 2009. 
59 Interview with central Liberian politician, Liberia, 4 May 2009. 
60 Interview with UNPBF staff, Monrovia, 2 May 2009; Interview with UN official, Monrovia, 3 October 2009. 
61 Interview with local UNMIL employee, Monrovia, 30 April 2009. 
62 Interview with UNDP staff, Monrovia, 29 September 2009. 
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control and autonomy is here rejected on the above grounds.63 Participants at a retreat for the UN 
Country Team and UNMIL senior management in 2008 identified such lack of “capacity and will” 
on the part of civil society and the government of Liberia alike as central obstacles that needed to be 
addressed in order to “improve the impact of the UN”.64 
 
Peacebuilders generally think in terms of the lack of ownership, justifying and explaining what they 
do by reference to the lack of capacity and responsibility on the part of local actors. Local actors, in 
government and in civil society, typically lean on an interpretation of ownership as an unconditional 
right, using it to criticize the external actors’ meddling, forward-leaning mode of operations. It is 
not surprising that lack of capacity or responsibility informs practically-driven interpretations of 
ownership within the prevailing liberal peacebuilding model. After all, a central assumption of this 
model is that local actors must be capacitated and learn new skills – they need to be trained and 
educated to govern in accordance democratic mechanisms and through the rule of law. However, 
what “skilled” means and when an individual or institution has sufficient “capacity” are defined and 
assessed very much with reference to how external actors judge progress against given (liberal) 
standards.  
Conclusions 
Our findings indicate that there are some major structural constraints involved in how the UN is set 
up that make it very difficult to uphold and live by the principle of national ownership. Key among 
these structural traits is, first, the accounting rules emanating from fears of corruption – a tendency 
that has become much stronger in recent years – which seem to seriously inhibit, structurally, efforts 
to establish national ownership. One example is how the UNDP operates in Liberia under the DEX 
modality. It puts the UNDP in a position where they, not the national government, call the shots. 
That is not to say that the Liberian government now has the necessary power and strength. By 
invoking the principle of ownership, a level of autonomy and leverage can be gained from the UN, 
and it can be put to use for different purposes, some of which may conflict with stated goals. But the 
government is seen as invoking ownership for the “wrong reasons” – precisely because the trust in 
international templates for building capacity, advice, and establishing a well-functioning state is so 
strong. Rarely, if ever, did we hear that external actors saw a project, or a priority, or a law, as being 
improved by virtue of the national government, or the legislature, claiming ownership by saying 
“no” or by dismissing the plans or suggestions of the external actors.  
 
Then there is the sheer weight of the rules and regulations set up to structure relations between the 
UN and the various national authorities. Here we find a heavily UN-oriented system of governance, 
with priorities and key decision making authority almost always located either in the UN at the 
country level, or with the UN in New York. To the extent that plans and priorities are accessible to 
the national government, the government is seen as an implementing partner that must team up with 
a UN entity which will serve as fund administrator. Moreover, the contents of applications show a 
systematic bias towards a certain type of “UN-speak” – a language that puts all but UN entities at a 
disadvantage. We also find that because of the rules and regulations, and the mechanisms for 
governing, emanating from UN entities in New York, there is no good institutional interface for 
establishing ownership: Bureaucratization and universalism trump efforts to be context-sensitive 
and to secure local ownership. As one interviewee noted, there is ample room for local actors, both 
government and non-government, to be included as implementing partners. There is also room for 
consultations, etc. But when it comes to the actual drafting and formulation of priorities and plans, 
that is done by UN and international actors, not locals. As implementing actors, they are involved – 
                                                     
63 Interview with UNMIL official, Oslo, January 2009. 
64 (UN 2008b: 2). 
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but they have not been involved in deciding what to do, or when or how. They look to others, often 
the UN, for decisions about what to do.  
 
Concerning ownership, we identify three ideal-typical interpretations. One model of ownership sees 
it as a goal or outcome of peacebuilding efforts. Ownership concerns getting local actors to 
“internalize” to “make their own” the values and goals that underwrite the liberal peacebuilding 
model. As such, how ownership is to be achieved can be thought of as persuasion, socialization, 
incentives, discipline, etc. In this prescriptive understanding, ownership is a modality for achieving 
“sustainability”. The second model sees ownership as a right – a question of domestic sovereignty 
and thus autonomy. A third model operates with ownership not as a goal, nor as a right, but as a 
conditional right, one that presumes capacity and responsibility. Factors that hamper such a model, 
in addition to faults in capacity building, are often seen to be a lack of motivation or a lack of will to 
take on this responsibility. Peacebuilders tend to think in terms of this third model, justifying their 
own actions by reference to what they see as lack of capacity and responsibility on the part of local 
actors.  
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Context 
In January 2005, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the Sudan 
Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), thereby ending 22 years of 
war, most of which had been in the southern part of the country. The agreement provided for the 
establishment of a largely autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) in Juba, while a 
Government of National Unity (GoNU) was formed in Khartoum with the participation of the 
SPLM but with the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) having an absolute majority. As part of 
the CPA, national elections are scheduled for April 2010 and a referendum over the future status of 
Southern Sudan (unity or secession) will be held in 2011. 
 
The international community has given massive support to the implementation of the CPA, and the 
rule of law (RoL) has been singled out as an important area despite the difficult conditions for 
promoting it. This brief report deals with RoL promotion as carried out as part of peacebuilding 
efforts by the international community.  
 
In the North, there are established and functioning governance structures and active civil society 
organizations. However, the government is autocratic and the NCP has used its majority, also in the 
Parliament, to limit independent voices and liberalization. There is lack of democratic governance; 
poverty and corruption are widespread, and social services are deteriorating and inaccessible. The 
NCP rulers have also used Sharia law to control the economy, to enforce cultural conformity, and to 
restrict social interactions of communities at the centre. In the peripheries, they have manipulated 
ethnic diversity and local issues to control groups and strengthen their own power. Marginalization 
and underdevelopment have led to a political and humanitarian crisis in Darfur, as well as severe 
problems in many other parts of Sudan.  
 
Regarding RoL, problems in the North include: politicization of police, judiciary and the entire 
justice sector; unequal distribution of resources; spread of corruption; disrespect of law by leaders 
and politicians; violation of human rights; and laws constraining the work of journalists, civil 
society organizations and the public interaction of people, especially women. Monitoring and 
accountability mechanisms in the correctional system are abusive to vulnerable groups, including 
displaced women and juveniles. Access to justice is further constrained by the low legal awareness 
and the high costs of legal procedures. For women, the cultures of many ethnic groups restrict them 
in seeking legal rights. 
 
Southern Sudan has been a war zone for a long time. There is lack of basic infrastructure, systems 
and services, except in the few areas that were controlled by the Khartoum government. The South 
lacks human capacities and skills; it is commonly held that work will have to start from scratch in 
all areas. Regarding RoL, there has been a lack of structures and systems. Only the informal system 
of justice were functioning, using customary laws that differ among groups and with discriminatory 
CMI REPORT LEARNING TO BUILD A SUSTAINBLE PEACE R 2010: 4 
31 
 
components against women. Promoting RoL, then, presents different challenges in the North and in 
the South.  
Rule of law activities 
UNDP, DFID and USAID provide the bulk of the support for RoL in Sudan (USAID only in the 
South). Activities in the North have aimed to improve the independence, transparency and 
efficiency of legal institutions and professionals. Activities targeting the police have included 
strengthening training institutions and curricula and building trust in the police service by 
promoting “community policing”. Support to the correctional sector has included training of the 
forces as well as rehabilitation of prisons. Support to the Ministry of Justice has been limited, 
focused mainly on the human resources department for formulation of strategies and systems and 
strengthening legal aid services. Assistance to the judiciary has included building up infrastructure 
and training of judges and judiciary administrative staff. Concerning access to justice, activities 
have focused on internally displaced people (IDPs) in Khartoum and other communities impacted 
by the war. Work has included human rights awareness, establishment of justice and confidence 
centres, training of paralegals and the provision of legal aid services. RoL forums have been 
organized. Activities within customary law have included support to some studies and to a 
customary law working group, and raising awareness for traditional leaders. The experiences of 
rape in Darfur served to heighten the concern for violence against women and resulted in activities 
to reduce violence and provide greater protection.   
 
In Southern Sudan, capacity-building initiatives have included support to the police, prisons, the 
South Sudan Judiciary Commission and the Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional 
Development (MoLACD). Main activities have been needs assessments, strategy formulation, 
construction of infrastructure, and provision of equipment. Basic training has been conducted for 
the police and prison forces; training of judges, state attorneys and staff of MoLACD has aimed at 
providing relevant skills and knowledge to the Southern Sudan context and needs. Furthermore, 
technical advice has been provided for the police and the MoLACD. Activities concerning access to 
justice have focused on legal awareness, establishment of confidence centres, training of paralegals 
and the provision of legal aid services at the county level, as well as piloting the formation and 
training of community policing groups. Some activities (mainly studies) have been carried out on 
customary law, and support to the Customary Law Working Group in the MoLACD has been 
considered by some donors. Some efforts have been made to address violence against women, and 
retrospective justice issues have been studied and discussed.  
 
Legal drafting has also been done in the South, as all basic laws had to be drafted. The international 
community provided technical assistance for the drafting. Approaches have differed. While some 
consultants drafted the laws and presented them for discussion, others used participatory processes.  
Ownership 
Local actors for rule of law are mainly government officials in the legal institutions at federal and 
local government levels. Local communities tend to be seen as recipients, rather than actors to be 
involved in decisions. The role of civil society organizations in RoL programmes is not clearly 
articulated by the government or the international actors, but local experts may be consulted at 
various stages and will often act as brokers with international institutions.  
 
Regarding “ownership”, the concept is understood differently by different actors. In general, local 
actors understand ownership as meaning their rightful participation in decision-making and 
implementation of projects, including budgetary matters (ownership as a right). According to Aisha 
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Faroug, “local ownership entails that donor-funded projects are for the interest of Sudan and that 
Sudanese have a say in it”.65 But while officials and some politicians stress the legitimate role of the 
government in representing the interests of citizens and in leading and controlling the process66, 
members of civil society organizations focus on the role of citizens and often consider local 
ownership to be constrained by the lack of democratic transformation.67  
 
While local ownership is seen as a key principle for aid effectiveness (according to OECD/DAC) 
and a core value for UN agencies, it is not set as a priority goal in most project documents; nor is 
there any obligation to consider or report on local ownership.68 The main concern is with processes 
that can ensure approval of the project or programme, and these are usually carried out with a 
minimum of participation by local actors.69 Ownership is not a core issue in the induction courses 
for international staff coming to Sudan, and promoting ownership depends on individual rather than 
institutional initiatives.  
 
Some of the international actors (including donors, advisors, consultants and staff of UN Mission 
and agencies and international organizations) see ownership as the involvement of local actors 
mainly in project implementation.70 To others, local ownership is ensured by taking a participatory 
approach, helping local communities to identify their problems and solutions, and training actors to 
build their capacities for doing things themselves.71 The latter reflects the assumption that locals as 
not knowing and in need of help to participate. Experts with international experience, however, 
often hold that ownership entails that nationals lead the process.72  
 
Asymmetrical relations between international and domestic actors are fostered by the widely held 
assumption that all local actors have limited capacities and that all international actors are in a 
position to lead, educate and strengthen local capacities and skills. This is noted by local actors, 
who often argue that there can be no ownership as long as the current situation of dependency 
persists.73 Studying the interaction between international and local actors, one is struck by its 
superficiality. Any encounters (typically planned, organized and funded by the international 
organizations) serve primarily to ensure that local partners are informed, which leads to the latter 
                                                     
65 Interview with Aisha Faroug, UNDO Officer, Judiciary Project; Khartoum, 16 February 2009. 
66 “Ownership means to be in the driver’s seat, not to give way to the donor to do things according to their perceptions 
and interests. We do things on our own as Sudanese taking in consideration our indigenous knowledge, norms and 
practices. We decided what training we want and they support us and we participated in the training” (Deng Piong riktig 
navn? Head of Training Unit, Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development, Government of South Sudan). 
Interview, Juba, 9 April 2009.   Also Interview with Dr Adil Alagib, Sudan Deputy Police Commissioner, Ministry of 
Interior; Khartoum, 31 March 2009; Interview with Asma Tiya, Director of Development Planning, Ministry of Economy 
and Investment, Kadugli, 12 August 2009.  
67 Interview with Manot A.Awet, Parliamentarian, National Assembly, Peace & Reconciliation Committee; Khartoum, 
16/2/2009; Interview with Hassan Abdel Atti, EGDE Consultancy; Khartoum, 16 March 2009.  
68 Interview with Tobby Bonnini, Senior Program Officer, Rule and Law Unit, UNDP; Khartoum, 12/2/2009; Interview 
with Safwan Ahmed, Legal Officer, Judiciary Project, UNDP; Khartoum 16 February 2009.  
69 Yasin Eisa, Senior Official, Ministry of International Cooperation asserted that although the Ministry’s responsibility is 
to coordinate donor-funded projects, still there are RoL projects implemented without knowledge of the Ministry; 
interview, Khartoum, 16 March 2009.  El Fatih Alsadig, Undersecretary in the Ministry of International Cooperation, 
added that “the police project supported by DFID is implemented with no cooperation or knowledge of the Police 
Training Directorate in the Ministry of Interior”; interview, Khartoum, 7 November 2008.      
70 Interview with Staff of Rule of Law Unit, UNDP, South Sudan, 9 April 2009.  
71 Interview with the staff of the Rule of Law Unit, UNDP Juba; interview with Kevin Macquire, UNDP, Judiciary 
Advisor, Khartoum, 15 February 2009; interview with Zaman, Kudus, Legal Specialist, UNDP, Kadugli, 12 August 2009.  
72 Interview with Ferdinand von Habsburg, Senior Advisor Peace, UNDP; Juba, 9 April 2009;  interview with Fred Yiga, 
Senior Police Advisor, UNDO,SS. Juba 10 April 2009; interview with Sue Taten, Teal Leader, Rule of Law Unit, Juba, 9 
April 2009; interview with Edward Christow, ATOs Consultancy, Khartoum, 7 February 2009. 
73 Interview with Jermaya Swaka, Senior Legal Advisor, Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development; Juba 
8 April 2009. His Excellency, Abdoun Agoo, General Secretary of the Government of South Sudan, noted in this 
connection: “Local ownership of peace is difficult and we need to consider the political, social and cultural factors related 
to law enforcement as substantial elements in promoting local peace” (interview, Juba, 8 April 2009). 
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becoming marginalized.74 However, it should also be mentioned that representatives of the 
government, particularly in Khartoum, have often no interest in RoL programmes, as these may 
challenge current power structures, financial policies and practices.  
Key findings 
The RoL programmes implemented in South Sudan have resulted in a number of outputs – as 
evidenced by the laws approved by the parliament, functioning or embryonic legal institutions, 
police stations and a Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development. This means the 
start of building up the supply side of the justice sector. Still to be considered are the dynamics of 
the cultural diversity of the country. According to Young Nyang, Senior Security Officer, “Police 
training needs to be considerate of the cultural diversity of the South and should help the policemen 
in managing their own ethnic identities in official context.”75  
 
In the North, international support has met with resistance and scepticism and has had limited 
results. Despite training of police and judges, discriminatory and restrictive practices remain 
prevalent. There are also some specific challenges. First, the community-based policing model 
introduced by UNMIS and UNDP was accepted by the Police Directorate. Committees are to be 
formed in villages and urban neighbourhoods, but in the North they are to be paid and held 
accountable to the Directorate. There is fear that the model will be used by the government to 
exercise even greater control over local communities. Among IDPs in Khartoum, community-based 
organizations were satisfied with their new knowledge of legal issues and human rights, yet 
recognize that access to justice remains constrained by the police and the security forces being 
under the ruling party. The Chief (omda) of Al Atmur Village east of Kadugli, in South Kordofan 
State, explained: “A group from UNDP visited the village some time ago and gave orientation on 
the opportunities for the legal aid services, but we have no legal problems because the native 
administration deals with the small problems and we have police station to deal with big ones.”76  
 
In the North, the low performance and early closure of the judiciary project have been attributed to 
inadequate design and a failure to appraise the political and other constraints under which the 
judiciary operates. Greater access of women to justice, combating violence against women, ensuring 
the involvement of women in activities, and gender- sensitive justice services were issues 
mentioned in the documents. These were “added” in the orientations and trainings, but without any 
specific targets for addressing gender injustice in laws and legal practices. Kaltum Dawalbait from 
Al Atmur Village mentioned that she had attended the workshop conducted by the UNDP project on 
legal aid, but that her real priority is a road to link the village to Kadugli.77 No assessment or studies 
have been made of the needs of women and the poor regarding access to justice. While partnership 
with civil society organizations for legal education and legal aid services has been promoted in 
some projects, there have been no serious attempts to involve women in decision-making and 
reviews of the justice sector programmes.  
 
On the general level, the RoL programmes in Sudan have had a limited focus on the demand side of 
justice sector reform. GoSS, GoNU and the donors have all given priority to rebuilding the justice 
                                                     
74 Zenab Hamda, UNDP Officer, Human Security Project with IDPs, Khartoum, noted, “We mobilized the IDPs 
communities to give then information about the project activities but they had had no chance to participate in any 
decision-making at any level”; interview, Khartoum, 12 February 2007. 
75 Interview with Young Nyang, Security Officer, Juba, 15 May 2009. 
76 Interview conducted by Research Assistants Farida Kuku and Mohamed Ahmed with James Kjori, Omda of Atmour 
Village (identified by UNDP officials as a site for implementation of the Strengthening of Access to Justice Project); 
interview, Atmour Village, South Kordofan, 16 August 2009. 
77 Interview  conducted by Research  Assistants Farida Kuku and Mohamed Ahmed with Kaltum Dawalbeit, Alatmour 
Village, South Kordofan, 16 August 2009.  
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sector through state-delivered RoL and access-to-justice programmes. Little attention has been 
given to the informal justice institutions and customary practices that are the choice for most people 
in most parts of the country.78 Significantly, activities have not been designed to establish effective 
systems to empower the poor and women. 
 
Regarding “ownership”, the process of programme/project design is mainly carried out by the 
international actors. In rare cases, mostly in the South and South Kordofan State (which was 
included in this research), needs assessment and consultation on priorities have been done with local 
actors from the justice sector. Forums and dialogue sessions have been organized mostly in 
Southern Sudan between Sudanese officials and grassroots representatives. These are spaces for 
communities to discuss their problems, but no learning processes or mechanisms have been 
considered to promote an understanding of the post-war situation in the justice sector. Where 
ownership is mentioned in the documents, it is mostly related to the role of the steering committee 
(or the project board) ‒ which, according to most review reports, is neither functional nor 
effective.79  
 
Ideally, local ownership involves the participation of local actors (government and the citizens) in 
the decision-making and implementation process of donor-supported programmes/projects. It means 
that local actors are to take responsibility for producing results for RoL reforms, and for sustaining 
them. Local ownership entails that the justice reform is built on existing legal systems and 
traditions, and supports cultural values that promote human rights.80  
 
We found that local ownership of RoL projects is weak in Sudan, for three main reasons. First of 
all, the post-war situation (specifically in the North), is characterized by lack of popular power and 
participation, weak governance, pervasive inequalities, poverty, corruption among the ruling leaders 
and elites who may not be interested in addressing priority issues or involving other local actors for 
legal reform. Second, the internationals have interests, approaches and practices that prevent the 
coordination of their assistance; moreover, they tend to share stereotyped perceptions of 
competence and capacities that are deemed lacking among local actors and that create asymmetry 
between international and local actors. Finally, there has been neglect as to the involvement of the 
population and recognition of the long-functioning informal justice systems ‒ the main resort of the 
majority of the people in the South.  
Summary 
Perceptions of “ownership” differ, but our review of the RoL programmes in Sudan has revealed 
that understanding is limited among local as well as international actors; moreover, that local 
ownership is not a priority or major concern among international actors. The RoL programme has 
remained dominated by the internationals. The interactions between the international actors and 
justice sector local actors have not been used for learning and sharing of knowledge to understand 
the political and socio-cultural dynamics, or to create a vision of shared responsibility for 
implementing the results of programme activities. There are various reasons for this, including what 
is seen as an intransigent government in Khartoum and a government without capacity in Juba. The 
                                                     
78 The youth in Rejaf Payam in Juba, trained by UNDP’s community policing, stressed that the training helped them to 
develop capacities for resolving disputes and their role is recognized within their group and the neighbouring ones – but 
that their role would not continue long, as they are working voluntarily and will soon have to stop that and try to find 
income-generating activity. Group discussion undertaken by Thomas Laku, Research Assistant, with Youth Group from 
the Rejaf Payam.   
79 See for example, “Strengthening access to justice and human security in the transitional areas (Abyei, South Kordifan 
& Blue Nile)”, Phase 2, 2006. UNDP, Khartoum.  
80 Adapted, with minor additions, from Anika Hansen and Sharon Wiharta 2007, The Transition to a Just Order: 
Establishing Local Ownership After Conflict: A Policy Report. Sandö – Stockholm: Folke Bernadotte Academy. 
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political will to implement RoL reform is particularly weak in Khartoum. Other important factors 
include the lack of donor coordination and the lack of commitment to principles laid down by 
OECD/DAC. 
 
RoL efforts in Sudan are fragmented. Projects tend to be isolated components and have not been 
planned as a comprehensive, coordinated programme, nor integrated with ongoing governance and 
livelihoods programmes. Different international organizations have projects with the same Sudanese 
institution, without coordination. Parallel structures for the execution of projects are both cost-
ineffective and limit the prospects for local ownership. 
 
As in many other post-war situations, governments and donors have given priority to rebuilding the 
justice sector through state-delivered programmes for the rule of law and access to justice. In 
practice this has meant ignoring the fact that the vast majority of the population, particularly in 
Southern Sudan but also in many other parts of the country, rely on non-state, local justice 
networks. Given the intensity and duration of the civil war, the GoSS has been overwhelmed by the 
task of reconstructing state institutions. This includes the state-provided justice framework, which 
remains severely deficient, while local justice networks as primary purveyors of service delivery 
receive hardly any support or recognition. In practice, then, the existing, legitimate providers of 
justice are almost totally neglected. 
 
Despite obstacles and challenges, there are opportunities for promoting local ownership of RoL 
programmes. This applies particularly in Southern Sudan, where the coordination mechanisms are 
stronger and where there exists a degree of mutual trust between GoSS and the international 
community ‒ which is not the case in Khartoum. In the course of this review, we encountered a 
growing willingness among the staff of donor agencies to learn from past mistakes. Let us hope that 
this will result in new approaches and strategies. In the North, the result of the 2010 elections may 
generate more obstacles, or new opportunities for promoting the rule of law in Sudan. 
Policy Implications  
Donors have traditionally approached RoL reform using a “democratization” lens, attempting to 
strengthen the independence of the judiciary in the face of an overpowering executive branch, and 
to provide assistance in drafting laws and constitutions. The approach has also included support for 
civil society organizations – as a means to increase the demand for better justice, monitor human 
rights, and provide legal assistance. Over the last 10 to 15 years, more and more elements have been 
added to the RoL agenda. However, the focus has remained on building more effective institutions. 
 
In the late 1990s, poverty reduction became the main objective of development. This was associated 
with a commitment to change how official aid is to be provided, using a “partnership approach” and 
the “ownership” of reform by local actors, and aimed at improving coordination, harmonization and 
alignment. The debate on aid effectiveness also emphasized that major goals (reduction of poverty 
and inequalities, building capacities and accelerating the achievement of the UN Millennium 
Development Goals) could not be attained without progress on gender equality and empowerment 
of women. The RoL area was initially not much affected by this agenda, which implies using a 
“poverty” lens and a greater concern with social outcomes. However, some donors (like Britain’s 
DFID) adopted an integrated approach that involves putting at the centre of the analysis how poor 
people themselves experience insecurity and injustice.  
 
In post-war situations, there is often a division between aid and politics. The RoL area seems to fall 
between two stools – democratization vs. poverty lenses. For such reasons, efforts are fragmented, 
and attention is placed on “getting things done”, often with little reflection on whether the 
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objectives are suitable or the impacts sustainable. State-centric approaches still dominate. The gap 
between the resources available to donors and those of their national partners means that donors 
may easily become excessively influential in deciding what to support.  
 
Post-war situations are also politically demanding, with consequences for effective partnership and 
ownership – as is clear from a comparison of Juba and Khartoum. Because governments in post-war 
situations (as in Khartoum) often have the coercive capacity to repress courts, helping the courts to 
function more efficiently may serve to further entrench anti-democratic governments and even 
increase cynicism among local populations about what the rule of law means in practice. And a 
community policing programme that is successful from the viewpoint of national (i.e. government) 
ownership may prove to have adverse consequences by increasing control over local communities.  
 
These examples show the need for a more sophisticated and detailed understanding of the internal 
politics and socio-cultural dynamics of the country in question. This knowledge will suffer if 
organizational turnover is high, as is often the case, and if there are no strong and sustained learning 
mechanisms. But this also gives rise to questions about the concrete policy implications of 
ownership.  
 
“Ownership” refers to the exercise of control and command over development activities. A country 
or an organization can be said to “own” its development programme when it is committed to it and 
is able to translate this commitment into effective action. However, since the purpose of 
development assistance is to benefit the population of a country, not the government as such, 
control over policy should arise in a context of credible consultation with national stakeholders. 
Recipient ownership is not a goal that develops automatically or that can be nurtured “later” out of a 
programme that is initially donor-driven. On the other hand, recipient governments and stakeholders 
may not have the capacity to assert ownership. In such cases, “fostering” ownership will imply the 
gradual re-negotiation of partnership, making it less unequal with regard to bargaining power, and 
more tolerant of differences in views, based on the recipient government and national stakeholders 
driving the development process, and donors assuming a more flexible policy approach. The 
evolving outcome is to pass control of development assistance to governments and stakeholders. 
Ownership does not require of donors that they should suspend judgment; rather, it implies that 
those judgments arise out of an interaction with national and local stakeholders.  
 
Efforts to facilitate stakeholder ownership (e.g. over sectoral programmes rather than projects where 
beneficiaries can be easily traced) will increasingly occur within the dialogue with a government. 
This means that the dialogue over shared values is of central importance to the ownership agenda. 
In the absence of shared values, or progress towards shared values, ownership cannot be transferred. 
Again, in Sudan we may note a difference between Juba and Khartoum, in the sense that the GoSS 
in Juba will at least express their sharing the set of values underlying the promotion of RoL reform, 
while the Khartoum regime has remained openly opposed to several of these values. 
 
In order to enhance the rule of law in such situations (Khartoum), donors should: (a) focus reform 
on issues or sectors that increase legal pressures for political accountability; (b) emphasize issues 
such as education (including the curricula of law faculties), freedom of the press, and popular access 
to diverse, international media and opinions that may be prerequisites for respect for the rule of law; 
and (c) generally support local activities and initiatives. Also, donors need to better understand and 
develop more effective working relations with two sets of institutions: the traditional, customary, 
and informal mechanisms that offer community-based justice or security and are used by the vast 
majority of people in conflict-affected countries; and second, NGOs and other more formal bodies. 
While serious concerns about informal justice systems may often be valid, ignoring them altogether 
is not a viable option.  
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Policy recommendations can be more effective if our understanding is based on disaggregating the 
external/ internal distinction of structures and actors. Developmental outcomes are not simply a 
function of the relations between the “international community” and “the state”, but a product of 
highly complex coalitions on either side of and across the internal/external divide. Here it will be 
important to consider non-state actors and institutions performing state-like functions on the 
periphery; how policy interventions are mediated through and translated by various state and non- 
state actors; and the impacts of international actors on the places and processes of negotiations.  
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Conclusion 
Local ownership has long been recognized as a fundamental principle for peacebuilding efforts, but 
implementation at the country level is still problematic, with varying degrees of international 
commitment. This report has tried to unearth how ownership is conceptualized and acted upon at 
the country level in four countries. A central objective has been to highlight the difference between 
the polished language of mandates and policy documents and the level of implementation of peace 
building efforts. This is important because without ownership, peacebuilding efforts are rarely 
sustainable. To improve the track record on this crucial dimension of peacebuilding, therefore, it is 
important to identify what different actors do rather than what they say. On this basis, it is possible 
to suggest avenues for improvement.  
 
The social transformations involved in peacebuilding typically challenge existing privileges and 
power. It is for this reason that ownership to such changes is so difficult to establish. A number of 
dilemmas present themselves here, including that of competing claims to ownership made by 
different local groups. To adjudicate between such claims and to find ways to accommodate such 
differences it is necessary not only to have extensive knowledge of the society in question. It is also 
necessary to offer frank assessments of what external actors can reasonably expect to achieve.  On 
this basis, we highlight the following core policy implications. 
Policy implications 
 Local ownership is particularly difficult to achieve in programs that initially are heavily 
donor-driven. Fostering ownership in such cases requires gradually re-negotiating the 
partnership to make it less unequal, more openness to different views, and the establishment 
of more flexible approaches.  
 
 A thorough understanding of internal politics and socio-cultural dynamics of a country is 
essential for effective assistance to peacebuilding. Such knowledge enhances the 
international community’s choice of assistance strategies as well. 
 
 Rapid turnover of staff is undesirable in at least two respects: It undermines the creation of 
strong and sustained learning mechanisms, and reduces the ability of staff to build and 
sustain good local contacts, thereby limiting the capacity to adapt goals and methods of 
operation to local context. 
 
 Support for greater transparency and accountability in local legislative processes can open 
up space for competing local parties to access the process and thereby contribute to 
ownership in a broader, national sense.  
 
 International actors should give greater consideration to enable local civil society to 
mobilize politically for social change. This would help to create genuine local ownership 
and reduce the conflicts that a more direct international role is likely to produce, above all 
in sensitive religious, legal and cultural issues. 
 
 Greater emphasis should be placed on developing administrative procedures that encourage 
local actors’ involvement in planning, prioritizing and implementing reforms.  
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 Organizational rules, reporting procedures and incentives should be restructured towards 
greater emphasis on local sustainability, rather than program outputs, as criteria for success. 
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Lack of local ownership is seen as a central explanation for why peacebuilding
efforts often fail to yield sustainable peace dividends. But how is local 
ownership understood and acted upon by those who are engaged in 
peacebuilding efforts at the country level? Based on research in four 
countries – Afghanistan, Haiti, Liberia and Sudan – this study fi nds that the
way ownership is operationalized by external actors at the country level is 
quite different from how it is defi ned in policy documents. The most prevalent 
operationalization is ownership as a conditional right with external actors 
seeing ownership as theirs to give to local actors when certain conditions 
(such as capacity or responsibility) are met. The result is often that reform 
efforts are unsustainable. This report suggests some concrete steps that can 
be taken to render ownership an operational principle.
